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AN EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARD FOR NATIONAL
ORIGIN SUBCLASSIFICATIONS: THE CONTEXT THAT
MATTERS
Jenny Rivera*
Abstract: The Supreme Court has stated, "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause."' Judicial review of legislative racebased classifications has been dominated by the context of the United States' history of racebased oppression and consideration of the effects of institutional racism. Racial context has
also dominated judicial review of legislative classifications based on national origin. This
pattern is seen, for example, in challenges to government affirmative action programs that
define Latinos according to national origin subclasses.
As a matter of law, these national origin-based classifications, like race-based
classifications, are subject to strict scrutiny and can only be part of "narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests., 2 In applying this two-pronged test
to national origin classifications, courts have struggled to identify factors that determine
whether the remedy is narrowly tailored and whether there is a compelling governmental
interest. While courts have appropriately focused on race specific themes and experiences
when the central feature of the classification is race, courts have not uniformly applied a
national origin "context" when the central feature is instead national origin. National origin
classifications, such as "Latino," often consist of members of various national origin
subclasses. Thus, some courts have considered the historical and current discrimination
against members of national origin subclasses as part of their equal protection analysis.
However, courts often rely on race-based approaches to evaluating this history and do not
uniformly assess subclass experiences.
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Some scholars and jurists have argued in favor of considering various cultural and ethnic
components of national origin in such cases, including language and historical group
assimilation. These approaches have neither comprehensively considered the full range of
context relevant to an equal protection analysis of national origin subclassifications, nor have
they gained a foothold in equal protection jurisprudence.
This Article argues that context that is specific to and conscious of the experience and
legal position of national origin groups matters just as much as racial themes and context in
race-based legislation. It analyzes equal protection challenges to Latino classifications and
presents a new approach to equal protection doctrine and discourse in which Latino national
origin subclassifications are contextualized and recognized as legally relevant and operative.
The Article demonstrates that the context that matters in national origin classification cases
depends on factors associated with country of origin subclassifications, as well as the
homogeneous classification of all persons of Latin American and Latino Caribbean descent
as Latino.
This Article's proposed uniform standard of review for national origin subclassifications
depends upon the legal, historical, cultural, and political context of subclasses. To justify a
contextualized definitional and constitutional analysis, it draws on the history surrounding
the definition of "Latinos" and "Hispanics" in the United States. Subclassifications are
constitutional if (1) the initial legislative or administrative decision to classify by national
origin satisfies the current strict scrutiny standard, which requires a narrowly-tailored remedy
that serves a compelling governmental interest; and (2) the subclassifications are based on
the intragroup dynamics and histories of the relevant target subclass, focusing on the
experience of individuals within the subclass as "Latinos" and as subclass members.
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution's Equal Protection Clause provides that no State
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."' The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence
designates all legislation identifying race-based categories for4
differential treatment as "suspect" and subject to "strict scrutiny."
Similarly, legislative differentiation based on national-origin
classification is also subject to this strict scrutiny standard.5 Although
the Court has established that legislative national-origin classification is
suspect and subject to strict scrutiny,6 the Court has yet to articulate a
comprehensive method of analysis reflecting national origin-based
discrimination in the United States. This Article considers equal
protection challenges to the categorization of Latinos in affirmative
action legislation, and the context of discrimination against Latinos in
the United States.7 Such analysis is critical because the Court has stated
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223, 227.
5. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining that national origin classifications are
subject to strict scrutiny); see also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 197
(1973) (stating that Hispanics constitute an identifiable class under the Fourteenth Amendment).

6. See supra note 5.
7. Courts have recognized the historical language-based group prejudice and significance of
language and its interconnectedness to culture and national origin. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641,646-47 (1966) (finding that New York's English literacy test was intended to prevent
Puerto Ricans from voting); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397-98 (1923) (noting with approval
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that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action
under the Equal Protection Clause."8 This context is no less important to
an equal protection analysis of classifications based on national origin.9
The need for a legal doctrine that considers such context is most
visible in affirmative action cases involving national origin groups. In
such cases, group-based remedies are contingent on how courts define
the discriminatory experiences of members of national origin
subclasses.10 In affirmative action cases involving national origin
categories, courts have considered historical and current discrimination
against members of various subclasses."' Race has played a central role
in courts' analysis of such national origin cases, but as discussed in this
Article, race and its attendant aspects do not provide a sufficient
foundation for legal analysis of national-origin classifications.
In addition to race, the roles of ethnicity, culture, language, and
history should be central to a contextualized equal protection analysis of
national origin categories. The question of the appropriate legal
consideration owed to these factors in determining the lawfulness of
national origin classifications is of immediate urgency to Latinos, who,
as a group, are targets of discrimination based on national origin' 2 as
the Supreme Court of Nebraska's finding that the purpose of a state statutory prohibition on
teaching in non-English language, applied to German language in this case, was to impose English
on foreigners); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust.: An Essay on American Languages,
CulturalPluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 328-50 (1992) [hereinafter Perea,
Demography and Distrust] (discussing the United States' history of prejudice and bias based on
language).
8. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
9. The Grutter case involved the constitutionality of a law school admissions process that
considered race and national origin as part of its criteria in admissions determinations. Id. Grutteris
a recent example of the Supreme Court's historical application of one equal protection analysis to
decisions based on race and national origin. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment extends its guarantees to all persons facing
discrimination, and applying this rule to Chinese launderers imprisoned as a result of discriminatory
city ordinances).
10. This assertion is examined in depth in Part III with discussion of Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v.
N.Y State Dep't of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2006), Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v.
County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001), Associated Gen. Contractorsof Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik,
214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000) (Drabik), Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997),
Peightalv. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545 (11 th Cir. 1994) (PeightalI1), O'Donnell Constr. Co.
v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and Peightalv. Metro. Dade County, 940 F.2d
1394 (11 th Cir. 1991) (Peightal I).
11. See infra Part Ill.
12. See, e.g., JOSE Luis MORIN, LATINO/A RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 45-47
(2005) (chronicling history of discrimination against Mexicans); id. at 47-48 (describing similar
history for Puerto Ricans).
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well as racial animus, 3 and who constitute the largest ethnic group in the
United States.1 4 The success or failure of affirmative action legislation
intended to help remedy this discrimination may hinge on this analysis.
Uncertainty as to how to define Latinos, and the lack of a paradigm of
discrimination that easily reflects Latinos' experiences, have resulted in
conflicting judicial decisions involving Latino subclassifications.' 5
Affirmative action legislation often defines Latinos, for purposes of
inclusion in the program, in terms of national origin subclassifications
(for example, "Puerto Ricans" or "Mexicans"). 16 Lower courts have
applied different standards when considering the inclusion or exclusion
of Latino national origin subclasses in these definitions of Latinos. 7 The
standards of review applied by lower courts to these definitions range
from strict scrutiny to rational basis review.' 8 In determining whether a
particular piece of legislation is constitutional, these courts have relied
on the Supreme Court's race-based jurisprudence, as well as their own
interpretation of historical discrimination against subclasses. 19 These
cases have thus compared national origin subclassifications to
classifications based on race.
This Article proposes a new standard for evaluating the
constitutionality of national origin subclassifications under the Equal
Protection Clause. In doing so, this Article uses an exploratory model to
examine equal protection cases that challenge the definition of the
"Latino"/"Hispanic" category in affirmative action legislation." Part I of
13. See, e.g., Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 568, 570-72 (2d Cir. 2000) (reviewing
Latina's claims of race discrimination, retaliation for resisting sexual harassment, and hostile work
environment against her former employer). See generally MORIN, supra note 12.
14. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic Population Reaches All-Time High of 38.8
Million, New
Census
Bureau
Estimates
Show (June
18,
2003),
available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2003/cbO3-1 00.html.
15. See infra Part Ill.

16. See infra Part Ill (discussing cases deliberating over the constitutionality of minority business
set-asides, including Jana-Rock Constr., Builders, Drabik,Monterey Mech., PeightalI1, 0 'Donnell,

and Peightal I).
17. See generally infra Part Ill.
18. Id.

19. Id.
20. In this Article persons of Latin American and Latino Caribbean descent in the United States
and Puerto Rico are referred to as "Latino," rather than "Hispanic." The Article uses the term
"Hispanic" only for purposes of uniformity and clarity and when necessary, for example, when
discussing or citing government classifications that refer to persons who are "Hispanic." When so
used, the Article treats the "Hispanic" category title as interchangeable with "Latino."
The term "Latino" represents the experiences and histories of persons of Latin American and
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this Article examines the "Hispanic" and "Latino" category, critiquing
legal analysis that equates national origin classifications with race-based
classifications. This Article's review provides the basis for critique of
current equal protection jurisprudence, which is singularly raceconscious in its historical perspective. Part I also describes and addresses
the "Latino paradox": 21 the bounded legal status of Latinos due, in part,
to the lack of a contextualized analysis of Latino identity and experience.
This Part elucidates how the homogenization of various
subclassifications of Latinos under the "Latino" category at times masks
inequities suffered unevenly among subclasses that differ racially,
historically, and by national origin. As a consequence, Latinos' status in
the United States is reduced to simple and inaccurate markers of success
or disadvantage, generalized to fit all Latinos equally. In addition,
homogenization of Latinos permits the political construction of all
national origin subclassification members as "non-American" foreigners,
who are thus vulnerable to political and social attacks based on Latinos'
actual or perceived status as undocumented individuals.22 Legal
recognition of national origin differentiation promotes Latinos' method
of self-identification.2 3 Thus, country of origin is legally and socially
recognized by courts and U.S. society as a viable legal identity reference
marker.
Parts II and III center the equal protection discussion of this Article
on an analysis of affirmative action Supreme Court decisions, and of
circuit court cases that involve Latino subclassifications, in order to

Latino Caribbean descent. The term "Hispanic" is representative of Latin America's connections
and history as it relates to Spain and Europe exclusively, and does not recognize the influence on
Latin America and Latinos of the history and cultures of indigenous peoples and people of African
descent. MORIN, supra note 12 at 8-10. For further discussion of this definition see infra note 38.

For further discussion on the issues surrounding the use of the terms "Latino" and "Hispanic," see
generally MORIN, supra note 12 at 8-10, Jose Calderon, "Hispanic" and "Latino": The Viability of
Categories for Panethnic Unity, 19 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 37, 39 (1992),
HISPANICSILATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES: ETHNICITY, RACE, AND RIGHTS (Jorge J.E. Gracia &

Pablo De Greiffeds., 2000).
21. The Supreme Court in 1991 referred to the "harsh paradox" faced by bilingual Latino
prospective jurors: "one may become proficient enough in English to participate in trial. . . only to
encounter disqualification because he knows a second language as well." Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991). This Article agrees that there is a unique "Latino paradox"-admittedly
harsh-that reflects the uncertain and unstable position of Latinos under the law in the United States
and exists because of the law's failure to recognize the importance of ethnicity, culture, language,
and history. See infra Parts I and IV.
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See infra Part I.D.
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expose the inadequacy of current equal protection analysis.24 Part II
summarizes the two seminal minority classification cases that have
defined the Supreme Court's equal protection affirmative action
jurisprudence.
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 26 the Court held that state and
local governmental affirmative action programs are subject to strict
scrutiny.2 7 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,28 the Court applied
strict scrutiny to a federal affirmative action program. 29 These two
decisions set the stage for equal protection review of all government
race-based classifications-state and federal-to be analyzed under the
most rigorous of constitutional standards. All subsequent cases in the
lower courts based on an equal protection challenge are measured by the
standards set forth in these cases.30
Thus, lower courts have had to consider how various classifications
satisfy this two-prong "strict scrutiny" standard requiring the
classifications to be "narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.",3 1 National origin classifications have been
subjected to arguments that they fail to meet either prong of this equal
protection standard.32 Part III discusses and compares several of these
circuit court equal protection cases involving various subclassifications
used to define affirmative action program beneficiaries.3 3 This Part
critiques the analysis in these cases and reveals the shortcomings of an

24. The standard proposed in this Article is also applicable to other national origin and ethnic
groups, but relies on the treatment of Latinos under the law to illustrate its viability and application.
25. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
26. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
27. Id. at 493-506.
28. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
29. Id. at 235-39.
30. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 (7th ed. 2004).

For a discussion of specific cases, see infra Part Ill.
31. Adarand at 227; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 285 (1986).
32. See infra Part Ill.
33. Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2006);
Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001); Associated
Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000); Monterey Mech. Co. v.
Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997); Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545 (11th Cir.
1994); O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Peightal v.
Metro. Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394 (11 th Cir. 1991).
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equal protection approach that does not consider the subclass's particular
experiences of discrimination.
Part III demonstrates that none of the circuit courts' approaches
adequately address the issues raised by an equal protection challenge to
legislative differentiation based on national origin subclassifications.
The inadequacies of these approaches are primarily due to the courts'
reliance on race-based equal protection jurisprudence and the courts'
attempt to compare national origin subclassifications to race-based
categories.3 4 National origin groups are not necessarily coextensive with
racial groups, and national origin groups have histories of oppression
and disempowerment that do not necessarily track those of racial
groups.3 5 This Part argues that the contextualization of subclassifications
is a necessary component to meaningful equal protection review and
would place national origin classifications on proper legal and historical
footing.
Part IV proposes an equal protection standard for national origin
subclassifications and applies it to the Latino category. Under this
standard, subclassifications would be constitutional if (1) the initial
legislative or administrative decision to classify and/or subclassify
Latinos by national origin satisfies the current strict scrutiny standard,
which requires a narrowly-tailored remedy that serves a compelling
governmental interest; 36 and (2) the national origin subclassifications are
based on the intragroup dynamics and histories of the relevant target
subclass, focusing on the experience of individuals within the subclass
as "Latinos" and as subclass members. For example, "Latino"
subclassifications including "Puerto Rican" or "Mexican" would reflect
the historical and political position of those who are of Latin American
and Latino Caribbean descent-justifying their inclusion in the umbrella
"Latino" category-as well as the particular Puerto Rican and Mexican
subclass experiences of oppression and discrimination because of their
affiliation with their country of national origin and with the "Latino"
category.
34. See, e.g., Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973).
35. See CLARA RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE: LATINOS, THE CENSUS, AND THE HISTORY OF
ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 129-52 (2000) [hereinafter RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE]

(discussing definition of Latinos as an ethnic group and as multiracial on the U.S. Census); see also
MORIN, supra note 12.
36. As discussed infra note 347, for pragmatic concerns and for purposes of this Article, I accept
the current strict scrutiny standard as a necessary part of the equal protection analysis without
critiquing the legal soundness and appropriateness of this strict scrutiny framework.
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Under the proposed standard, the subclassifications are constitutional
if they reflect the intra- and intergroup dynamics and histories of the
Latin American and Latino Caribbean diaspora in the United States and
the relevant state or locality. These subclassifications respond to the
discrimination, bias, and subjugation experienced by persons in the
Latino category and respective subclasses because of their subclass
affiliation and because they are perceived as part of a Latino "class. 37
I.

EQUAL PROTECTION TREATMENT OF LEGALLY
RELEVANT IDENTITY MARKERS: RACE, ETHNICITY,
CULTURE, LANGUAGE, AND HISTORY

Race, ethnicity, cultural identity, linguistic ability, individual and
ancestral national origin, U.S. citizenship, and physical characteristics
are all markers that society uses to identify individuals as members of
groups. Regardless of the specifics of these markers, persons of Latin
American and Latino Caribbean descent are grouped under a "Latino" or
"Hispanic" umbrella category. 38 The Latino category provides a legally
37. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
38. The term "Latino" in this Article refers to persons from or persons with ancestors from Latin
America and the countries in the Caribbean where Spanish or Portuguese is the national language,
referred to here as the Latino Caribbean. The Latino Caribbean includes, in alphabetical order, the
following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Puerto Rico is included in this list although it is a commonwealth of the United States because of
its Latino Caribbean history and because of the position and identification of Puerto Ricans as
Latinos in Latin American society and in the United States. See MORIN, supra note 12, at 22-28
(discussing Puerto Rico's colonial history and relationship to the United States and Puerto Ricans'
status as Latinos in the United States); JUAN GONZALEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF
LATINOS IN AMERICA 246-67 (2000) (discussing Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States);
CLARA RODRIGUEZ, PUERTO RICANS BORN IN THE U.S.A. 1-25 (1991) (discussing the history of
colonialism and migration of Puerto Ricans to the United States, and the impact of the migration
experience on Puerto Ricans as an ethnic and racial group). See generally, PUERTO RICO AND
PUERTO-RICANS: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND SOCIETY (Adalberto Lopez & James Petras eds., 1974)
(collection of scholarly works on Puerto Rico under Spanish rule and as a U.S. commonwealth, and
on Puerto Ricans living and working on the U.S. mainland); Ediberto Roman, The Alien-Citizen
Paradoxand Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing
that the people of Puerto Rico have unequal citizenship status, in part shaped by U.S. racial and
ethnic-based prejudices, which has resulted in an alien-citizen paradox); Ediberto Roman, Empire
Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1139-1211
(1997) (discussing Puerto Rico's status under U.S. rule and the Puerto Rican people's inability
under such rule to control their own destiny).
Latinos who migrated to other parts of the Caribbean and eventually to the United States are
included within the definition of Latino as used in this Article if they have ancestral roots in any of
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relevant basis for assessing discrimination and unequal treatment shared
by all members of the group based on being Latino. This unified
consideration of Latinos thus serves important legal and social ends and
has continued relevance. Nevertheless, while maintaining the
homogenous category as a way to secure equal protection under the law
for Latinos, the law must continue to explore how Latinos experience
discrimination and whether the Latino category is always the best
measure of unequal and biased treatment.
The general "Latino" category is indispensable to recognizing
discrimination and is an important basis for designing remedies, such as
affirmative action programs. It has its limits, however. Where there are
subclasses,
of Latino
experiences
discriminatory
particular
homogenization of subclass members as "Latinos" masks inequalities in
discrimination. Moreover, those hostile to Latinos have relied on Latino
homogenization to facilitate the construction of all Latino
subclassification members as foreigners, who are not entitled to or
worthy of legal protections. 39 This construction neither accurately
the Latin American and Latino Caribbean countries listed in this footnote.
This definition of Latino includes a person born in or outside of Spain who has one biological
parent of Latin American or Latino Caribbean descent. It excludes persons who are of Portuguese or
Spanish descent who do not have familial ancestral roots in Latin America or the Latino Caribbean.
It also excludes an individual born in Spain to parents who are not of Latin American or Latino
Caribbean descent. Thus, a person born in or outside of Puerto Rico with one parent born in Spain
and with one parent with ancestral roots in Puerto Rico comes within the definition of Latino, but a
Spaniard who relocates to Puerto Rico does not come within this definition of Latino.
Spaniards and Portuguese are excluded from the definition of Latinos because from a national
perspective their ancestral roots are "European." From a political and social perspective they are
excluded because Latinos share a history and experiences as the objects of colonialism, imperialism,
and oppression, which are not commonly shared by persons who are Spaniards or Portuguese. See
JOHN CHARLES CHASTEEN, BORN IN BLOOD AND FIRE: A CONCISE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 15

(2001) (beginning this history of Latin America by asserting that "[c]onquest and colonization form
the unified starting place of a single story"); see also FRANK D. BEAN & MARTA TIENDA, THE
HISPANIC POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) (discussing generally the U.S. Latino

population, including a discussion of ethnicity); GONZALEZ, supra (discussing colonialism and
Spanish conquest and the current status of Latinos in the Unites States).
While this definition is not perfect, and the wisdom of excluding persons whose sole ancestry is
Spanish or Portuguese is debatable, it is the definitional line that is drawn for purposes of this
Article. The definition is based on the historical and cultural development of Latin America and the
Latino Caribbean, and its population and ancestors in those countries and in the United States.
39. See Suzanne Oboler, Racializing Latinos in the United States: Toward a New Research
Paradigm,in IDENTITIES ON THE MOVE: TRANSNATIONAL PROCESSES IN NORTH AMERICA AND THE

CARIBBEAN BASIN 58 (Liliana R. Goldin ed., 1999) (arguing that Latinos in the United States are
treated as foreigners, regardless of status and historical relationship to the United States); MORIN,
supra note 12, at 62-63 (describing how Latinos are negatively stereotyped as foreigners, and as
unemployed and uneducated); Suzanne Oboler, "It Must Be A Fake!" Racial Ideologies, Identities,
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describes the actual status of any particular Latino, nor the fact that some
subclasses, by law, are citizens-such as Puerto Ricans-or have legal
work authorization or other lawful status-such as certain Central
American immigrants.4 °
The disadvantages of homogenization of identity and experience are
compounded in equal protection discourse by the race-based referential
nature of current equal protection analysis. 4 1 Reliance on race-based

and the Question of Rights, in HISPANICS/LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES: ETHNICITY, RACE, AND
RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 125-44; see also FELIPE PIMENTEL, THE DECLINE OF PUERTO RICAN
FULLTIME FACULTY AT THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK (CUNY) FROM 1981-2002 15-16

(2005) (recommending that data on Hispanic faculty be disaggregated to reveal data for Puerto
Ricans as a separate group in order to avoid masking the apparent decline of Puerto Rican faculty at
one of the largest public universities in the United States).
There is scholarship on the viability and desirability of a panethnic construction of Latinos and
Latino identity. See, e.g., LATINOS: REMAKING AMERICA (Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco & Mariela M.
Paez eds., 2002) (collection of scholarly works on Latinos in the United States which consider
various aspects of Latino experiences); Calderon, supra note 20 at 37-44 (discussing political and
social consequences of panethnic approach to Latinos in the United States).
40. See, e.g., The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L.
No. 105-100, Title II, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193, codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. NACARA
provides certain Cubans and Nicaraguans present in the United States with an opportunity to apply
directly for permanent residence. It also provides certain Guatemalans and Salvadorans with the
opportunity to apply for relief from deportation under the more lenient pre-1996 rules. In addition,
persons from some countries of the former Soviet Union may benefit from NACARA. Different
requirements apply depending on the country of nationality. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Immigration through the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act
(NACARA) Section 203, http://www.uscis.gov (follow "Services and Benefits" hyperlink, then
follow "Humanitarian Benefits" hyperlink, then follow "Applying for Immigration Benefits through
the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA)" hyperlink).
41. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (relying on standards related to discrimination
based on race and applying an equal protection standard based on racial classifications to uphold the
use of race in admissions decisions in a case deciding that diversity of student body is a compelling
interest in the law school admissions context, even though the challenged policy was committed to
"racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students ... like AfricanAmericans, Hispanics and Native Americans"); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991)
("Just as shared language can serve to foster community, language differences can be a source of
division. Language elicits a response from others, ranging from admiration and respect, to distance
and alienation, to ridicule and scorn. Reactions of the latter type all too often result from or initiate
racial hostility.").
The manner in which "Latinos" are defined creates further confusion in developing an equal
protection analysis for national origin discrimination experienced by Latinos. A discussion and
critique on the formation and identification of Latino membership within national origin groups is
beyond the scope of this Article, however. This Article proposes the legal standard for determining
whether a Latino subclass should be part of a Latino category for a particular remedial purpose, but
does not address how any particular individual is identified or otherwise labeled as a member of a
subclass.
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conduct or a "race surrogate" is central to equal protection claims.42
Race bias and privilege have tremendous impact on Latinos, but tell only
part of the story of different treatment based on national origin.
Latinos' national origin identity is not merely a "surrogate for race. 43
Rather, it is intertwined with race, culture, ethnicity, language, and
different histories of oppression in and outside of the United States.
Latinos experience discrimination because they are perceived to be
"Latinos"-based on these various aspects of identity-and because of
national origin subclassifications (such as "Mexican" or "Cuban"),
which are similarly reflective of these various identity markers. The
Supreme Court's reliance on a "race surrogate" does not adequately
address national origin discrimination because it ignores these other
aspects of national origin and their relationship to and dependence on
racial privilege in Latin America, the Latino Caribbean, and the United
States.44
A.

The Centrality of Race to Equal ProtectionAnalysis

The Supreme Court has stated that the Equal Protection Clause
protects "personal rights" that inure to the benefit of the individual.45
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's apparent individual rights
approach to equal protection, group affiliation based on race has been a
vital concern in equal protection analysis. Society, government
institutions, and the courts have historically considered association with
a particular group--both an individual's voluntary association and
association based on societal perception-as fundamental to the
individual and the treatment accorded to the individual in terms of equal
protection.46
42. See, e.g., Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 ( "It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some
communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a
surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis."); see also infra Part L.A and B.
43. Cf Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371.
44. See infra note 53 and accompanying text; see also Ariela J. Gross, "The Caucasian Cloak":
Mexican Americans and the Politics of Whiteness in the Twentieth-Century Southwest, 95 GEO. L.J.
337 (2007) (discussing complexity of White racial identity for Mexican-Americans and the legal
system's treatment of that identity).
45. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (citing Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
46. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (subjecting race, a group
classification, to strict scrutiny "to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has
not been infringed"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06 (stating that the government failed to meet the
narrowly-tailored prong of the equal protection analysis, because it failed to establish a history of
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An equal protection analysis centered on race, and on how groups of
people have been "racialized ,' is historically, as well as legally,
justified. The United States' history of enslavement of African Blacks, 48
legalized segregation based on Blackness and Whiteness, 49 and the
institutionalization of race-based privileges that disadvantage Blacks and

advantage Whites, 50 are more than sufficient reasons to support a racebased equal protection analysis. Federal and state laws have helped to

establish the dominance of race as a factor in the establishment of
unequal systems of justice. 51 This historical and legal reality of the
experience of African Americans and persons of African descent in the
United States is the most recognized example within U.S. society of
oppression and subjugation of one group over another, with disastrous
consequences for the oppressed group (Blacks) and advantageous
consequences for the benefited and privileged group (Whites). 2
past discrimination against certain listed groups in order to justify inclusion of those groups in
affirmative action plan); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) ("The experience of our
Nation has shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some groups. Our response
to that experience is reflected in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.");
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting that equal protection
also serves to protect discrete and insular minorities); see also Taunya Lovell Banks, What is a
Community? Group Rights and the Constitution: The Special Case of African Americans, I
MARGINS 51, 53 (2001) ("constitutional rights in the United States are framed as individual rather
than group rights. Courts, however, routinely recognized group rights.").
47. See infra note 53 (discussing the "racialization" of Latinos).
48. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).
49. See, e.g., id.; C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d ed. 1966);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1896) (upholding race-based separate but equal
treatment of Blacks and Whites); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-93 (1954)
(discussing the history of segregation in the United States).
50. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (5th ed. 2004); DERRICK BELL,
AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Propery, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993); In re African-American Slave Descendants
Litig., 471 F.3d 754 (2006) (discussing class action on behalf of Africans and their descendants in
the United States for reparations based on private companies' slave-based profits), cert. denied, U.S.__ 128 S.Ct. 92 (2007).
For a comprehensive introduction to critical race theory and critical race feminism, two scholarly
schools that critique legal and political doctrine and discourse focused on race and race and
feminism, respectively, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed.,
1997); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6
Crenshaw et al. eds. 1995).
5 1. See generally BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, supra note 50.
52. See generally supra notes 48-50 and accompanying citation. Whites have been privileged by
their race, yet they often either do not recognize this privilege or deny being the beneficiaries of a
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Race has also been part of the history of discrimination against
Latinos; this history further illustrates the persistence and power of the
U.S. racial hierarchy. However, ethnicity, culture, language, history, and
the political and economic relationship of the United States to
constituent countries within Latin America and the Latino Caribbean
have also been at the core of discrimination against Latinos.53 Indeed,
race and the racialization 54 of Latinos have played a significant role in
the development of Latino identity both in and outside of the United
States. There is a rich body of scholarship wherein scholars have argued
that race is relevant and important to understanding discrimination faced
by Latinos, and that being racialized affects the opportunity for Latinos
to seek legal recourse.5 5 The law, as written and interpreted by the
courts, lacks a framework to address the discrimination and inequality
racial hierarchy. See Douglas Hartmann, Joseph Gerteis, & Paul R. Croll, Toward an Empirical
Assessment of Critical Whiteness Theory 10 (2007) (unpublished American Mosaic Project
working paper, on file with author and cited with permission) (data suggests that a significant
number of Whites recognize that Blacks have been actively disadvantaged but do not see how
Whites have been actively advantaged).
53. There exists a body of scholarly literature on race and Latinos, and the "racialization" of
Latinos. Within this literature, several scholars have argued that race has, at times, overshadowed
efforts to understand and eradicate national origin discrimination, and how Latinos have been
"racialized" under the law. Scholars have also discussed how Latinos' historical and cultural
identities have been forged by political and economic struggles. See, e.g., MORIN, supra note 12, at
43-110; Obeler, Racializing Latinos, supra note 39 at 45-68; NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS:
LATINOS, BLACKS, AFRO-LATINOS (Anani Dzidzienyo & Suzanne Oboler eds., 2005) (collection of
writings on race and Latinos); HISPANICS/LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES); supra note 20
(collection of essays discussing Latino identity); THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998) [hereinafter LATINO/A CONDITION] (collection of
works on Latinos, including works on race and national origin); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White
Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1213 (1997); Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as' Race and
Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 69, 150 (1998) ("The fusion and confusion of [Latinos']
race and nationality has served to create an image of Latinos as a homogenized population, thus
negating the different class experiences, linguistic, racial and ethnic distinctions within the Latino
population."); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 50, at 375 (stating that race
is a driving force in the experience of Latinos in the United States: "Race should be used as a lens
through which to view Latinos/as in order to focus our attention on the experiences of racial
oppression. However, it should also direct our attention to racial oppression's long-term effects on
the day-to-day conditions encountered and endured by Latinofa communities.").
In this Article I attempt to address several issues raised by these scholars about the role of race
and the significance of Latino identity by concluding that Latinos are better protected under the law
if the law accepts and considers the experience of being associated with the Latino category and
with particular national origin subclasses.
54. See supra note 53 (reviewing scholarship on racialization of Latino population).
55. See supra note 53 for citations to significant scholarly work by various academics focusing on
race and Latinos.
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faced by Latinos in the course of Latinos' day-to-day existence.5 6 This
Article argues that courts should contextualize Latinos' experiences by
focusing on other factors associated with national origin
subclassifications in addition to race in the affirmative action context.
Race and national origin are neither synonymous nor mutually exclusive.
Race alone is an ineffective measure of Latino experiences because
the focus should be on the dynamic of oppression and subjugation, based
on whatever identifiers and tools are currently being used by the
dominant group. To the extent that race plays a role in the unequal
treatment of Latinos, it must be recognized as relevant, but when other
markers, such as ethnicity, culture, and language are the basis for
oppressive and disadvantageous treatment, they must be considered in
the analysis and subjected to constitutional scrutiny.
Despite the role of these other aspects of Latino identity, within equal
protection discourse, race has been treated as a predominant factor in
Latinos' experiences, resulting in viewing ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
characteristics through the analytical framework of race-based legal
doctrine.57 Such treatment is not wholly unjustifiable as applied to
Latinos because race is an ever-present aspect of Latinos' experiences
and does have an immense impact on the lives of all Latinos.
In Latin America, the Latino Caribbean, and the United States, race is
part of the social and political construction of individual subpopulation
identity. 58 However, color, which refers to various shades of
56. The law's current inability to address the unequal legal and social status of Latinos, as
illustrated throughout the case law presented in this Article, has also been discussed by many legal
scholars. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 44; see also Tanya Kateri Hemdndez, Latino Inter-Ethnic
Employment Discrimination and the "Diversity Defense, 42 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 259, 261

(2007) (explaining that "non-White racial hierarchies appear opaque to decisionmakers and other
legal actors, who find it difficult to recognize the indicators of discrimination."). See generally Berta
Hemandez-Truyol, Angela Harris & Francisco Vald6s, Beyond the First Decade: A ForwardLooking History of Latcrit Theory, Community and Praxis, 17 LA RAZA L.J. 169 (2006).

57. See infra notes 38 & 39 and accompanying text; see also Sandrino-Glasser, supra note 53, at
69 (discussing the conflation of race and national origin and ethnicity as applied to Latinos and how
this conflation undermines adequate legal responses to the discrimination experienced by Latinos);
Perea, supra note 53, at 1213 (discussing how the racial Black/White binary paradigm results in the
marginalization of Latinos and other people of color because it analogizes others to Blacks, without
full consideration of experiences of Latinos and other people of color); MORIN, supra note 12 at
10-13 (discussing how hemispheric dominance, hegemony and racism have shaped the fights of
Latinos/as in the United States, and "racialized" Latinos as foreign and inferior to Whites).
58. NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 53; Eduardo Mendieta, The Making of New
Peoples: Hispanisizing Race, in HISPANICS/LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES: ETHNICITY, RACE,
AND RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 45-59; Eduardo Bonilla-Silva & Karen S. Glover, "We are All
Americans ": The Latin Americanization of Race Relations in the United States, in THE CHANGING
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pigmentation, is also significant to understanding how identity is
constructed based on physical characteristics and their association with
particular racial categories. 59 For many Latinos throughout Latin
America, the Latino Caribbean, and the United States, race and color are
the predominant identity characteristics of their quotidian existence.
However, race and color are defined broadly, and include more than
Black and White categories. Nevertheless, these Black and White
categories of the identity hierarchies-whether considered to be race or
color based-are positioned the same, whether in Latin America or the
United States. The hierarchies elevate "White" to a privileged position
and relegate "Black" to a disadvantaged position. Anything that is
considered to lie in between is merely a degree away from one towards
the other.60
Notwithstanding the significance of race and color, race and the
various physical characteristics associated with racial categories remain
but one aspect-albeit a critical one-of Latinos' experiences and
identity. 61 The courts should recognize and integrate into a legal
framework the experiences of Latinos as Latinos. Equal protection
scrutiny of national origin categories and of the history of national origin
discrimination must consider the position of all identity aspects of
national origin. Race and these other aspects of identity that are central
to Latinos, whether they are the basis for adverse discrimination or
remedial differentiation, should be subject to heightened scrutiny.
However, the Court's constitutional analysis of Latino national origin
categorization has been limited to consideration of bias derived from
race-like animus-or what the Court has referred to as a "race
surrogate., 62 When national origin claims devolve to race-based claims,
or mirror or mimic claims of discrimination based on race, claims of
TERRAIN OF RACE AND ETHNICITY 149-83 (Maria Krysan & Amanda E. Lewis eds., 2004)
(discussing how race has impacted Latinos and how race as experienced in Latin America has
affected racial discourse in the United States).
59. Suzanne Oboler & Anani Dzidzienyo, Flows and Counterflows: Latinas/os, Blackness, and
Racializationin Hemispheric Perspective,in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 53, at II

(discussing Latin American pigmentocracy as a gradated system of prejudices based on shades of
color); Seth Racusen, Making the "Impossible" Determination: Flexible Identity and Targeted
Opportunity in Contemporary Brazil, 36 CONN. L. REV. 787, 790 (2004) (discussing affirmative
action in the context of Brazil where Brazilians identify based on colors and appearance, rather than
on races, ethnicitics, or nations).
60. See, e.g., Oboler & Dzidzienyo, supra note 59.
61. See supra notes 53 & 56 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,371-72 (1991).
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national origin discrimination are subjected to strict scrutiny and are
often determined to be equal protection violations. 63 Equal protection
challenges to classifications based on national origin will receive the
same strict scrutiny as classifications based on race only where those
national origin classifications are coextensive with racial classifications.
This treatment of national origin is problematic because it undervalues
other identity markers, and because it fails to consider how non-Latinos
perceive and treat Latinos and how Latinos perceive themselves, based
on country of origin.
B.

National Origin as Equal Protection Race Surrogate: The
RacializedLatino Paradox

A review of Supreme Court precedent reveals that the Court has
focused its equal protection jurisprudence on race as a primary and
defining characteristic of national origin. In Hernandez v. New York,64 a
leading Supreme Court equal protection decision regarding Latinos, the
Court made it clear that national origin characteristics must mirror race
characteristics to receive automatic application of heightened scrutiny:
"[i]t may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities,
that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be
treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis. 65
Unless language or some other Latino identity characteristic acts as a
race surrogate, equal protection review is limited to the deferential
rational basis test.66
In Hernandez, the Court stated that language-based treatment does not
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a raceneutral explanation. 67 Nevertheless, the Court specifically allowed for
63. See, e.g., id. at 372 (stating that language discrimination under certain circumstances, "may be
found ...to be a pretext for racial discrimination"); Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)
(exclusion of Mexicans from jury service because of ancestry or national origin violates the
Fourteenth Amendment). Several authors have noted the comparison of national origin to race in
civil and criminal cases and the flaws in such comparisons. See Perea, Demography and Distrust,
supra note 7, at 269, 350-77 (language is national origin proxy not recognized as discrimination);
Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA

L. REV. 1 (1992) (discussing the impact of the Hernandez decision); Sandrino-Glasser, supra note
53, at 131-50 (discussing the conflation of race and ethnicity in judicial decisions).
64. 500 U.S. 352 (1995).
65. Id. at 371.
66. See supra note 7 (citing cases in which language claims are reviewed under rational basis
because they do not constitute national origin discrimination).
67. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371.
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the possibility of a successful language-based claim where such claim is
the equivalent of a race-based claim of discrimination. 68 The Court
opined that language discrimination, under certain circumstances, "may
be found ... to be a pretext for racial discrimination. 69
The Supreme Court's focus on race as the core organizing principle of
its equal protection analysis is also illustrated in its recent affirmative
action decision involving admissions in higher education. In Grutter v.
Bollinger,70 the Court upheld a law school admissions procedure that
considered both race and ethnicity.71 Although the procedure
emphasized both factors, the Court mentions race 360 times, compared

68. Id.
at 371-72.
69. Id. at 372. Circuit courts have similarly rejected a per se rule on language discrimination in
cases involving constitutional and statutory-based claims. These courts often reject these claims
absent some showing that language is a mere proxy for race or country of origin based-national
origin discrimination. See, e.g., Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 871 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that
classification based on ability to speak a foreign language is subject only to rational basis review
because such language ability is "'relevant to the achievement of [a] legitimate state interest'," is
not immutable, and is not comparable to the "history of discrimination based on factors such as race
or national origin" (quoting Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)));
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no evidence of disparate
impact in a case involving the application of an English-only rule to bilingual Latinos because
speaking at the workplace is a privilege of employment, bilingual Latinos can easily comply with
the rule and noncompliance would be a matter of individual preference, and rejecting EEOC
guidelines that an English-only policy is a per se violation of Title VII where there was nothing "in
the legislative history to Title VII that indicates that English-only policies are to be presumed
discriminatory"); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981)
(holding that application of English-only rule during parts of the work day does not constitute
national origin discrimination). Courts have also rejected claims of group bias based on language in
cases involving government decisions to provide service information only in English to limited
English and non-English speakers. See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41-42 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984) (holding that the government's refusal to provide social
security information in Spanish is subject to rational basis review and not strict scrutiny because
provision of English language information does not result in group discrimination against
Hispanics); Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219-20 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding that no suspect
classification based on nationality or race exists in case on behalf of Spanish-speakers, Puerto
Ricans, and persons of Spanish-American ancestry challenging English-only civil service
examination); Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that the
government's provision of English-only unemployment benefit notices does not deny equal
protection to Latino plaintiffs).
70. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
71. Id. at 343. While the Court and the admission policy do not explicitly articulate "national
origin" within the diversity considerations, the admission policy notes "racial and ethnic diversity"
with particular attention to "students from groups which have been historically discriminated
against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment
might not be represented in our student body in meaningful numbers." Id. at 316 (citing Michigan
Law School Admission Policy).
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to a mere twenty-one mentions of ethnicity and national origin, which it
usually mentions in tandem with race.7 2 The Court includes fluency in a
language other than English with other "possible bases for diversity
admissions" other than race, including "liv[ing] or travel[ing] widely
abroad ...overcom[ing]
personal
adversity
and
family
hardship... exceptional records of extensive community service,
and... successful careers in other fields., 73 These other bases are, of
course, race-neutral, but they are also ethnicity- and national originneutral. They are wholly independent and unrelated to national origin as
a category of prohibited classification. Thus, fluency in a language other
than English is neither part of nor a proxy for a prohibited classification;
it is not a characteristic of race and therefore, it is not part of national
origin or ethnicity.
Even though fluency in a language other than English was a favored
skill in this case and potentially benefited bilingual Latinos and nonLatinos alike, this analysis of language fluency fails to consider the role
that language plays for native speakers and for those for whom language
is not merely a mode of communication but also a cultural marker. By
failing to consider the cultural and historical roles of language, the
Supreme Court equates the use of a language other than English by
national origin groups to the use of a second language by someone who
learns the language for the sole purpose of communication, without
reference to a cultural or ethnic connection. The two do not experience
or necessarily deploy language for the same reason. Thus, under the
Supreme Court's analysis, only the "Racialized Latino"--and here I
mean the person for whom the law has elevated race above other aspects
of identity--has a claim subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court has erroneously interpreted national origin
characteristics and has sought to compare them to race. Discrimination
against Latinos may occur not solely because of any perceived racial
affiliation, but also because of society's reactions to other aspects of
Latino identity. At different times in the history of the United States
non- and limited-English language speakers, persons from nonAmerican cultures, non-European immigrants, individuals affiliated with
Latin America and the Latino Caribbean, and persons with political and
economic loyalties to other countries based on their national origin have
72. See id.
73. Id. at 338.
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experienced discrimination and have been distrusted by the majority
population.74 The scrutiny of all things "foreign" and all people
perceived as not American, or not American enough, is particularly
contentious in a post-9/11 United States, where linguistic and national
loyalties are front and center and equated with an oath of honor to the
United States.75
For Latinos, a connection to a country of national origin outside of the
United States, the Spanish or Portuguese languages, and a culture that
resonates with the experiences and community mores of Latin America
and the Latino Caribbean, are precisely the cultural capital that solidifies
a sense of being part of a Latino group. Affection for and reclamation of
a country of national origin is of primary importance to Latinos. 76 Thus,
74. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (evaluating the constitutionality of a
statute which prohibited the teaching of any language but English in grade schools); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643-45 (1966) (examining New York literacy test that had the effect of
disproportionately denying New York City residents who migrated from Puerto Rico the right to
vote); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) and Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 85-88 (1943) (reviewing subjection of persons of Japanese ancestry to curfew and
detention during World War 11); Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (upholding
Chinese exclusion); see also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 311 (1922) (holding that the
Constitution did not fully apply in U.S. territories not incorporated into the United States, and
thereby distinguishing between Puerto Ricans as individual U.S. citizens and as inhabitants of
Puerto Rico for purposes of enjoying full rights of citizenship); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S.
91, 98 (1914) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment did not apply to
the inhabitants of the United States' Philippine territory); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138,
145-46 (1904) (holding no right to jury trial for inhabitants of the U.S. Philippine territory); Hawaii
v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 214-18 (1903) (holding no constitutional or statutory right to indictment
by grand jury or conviction by unanimous petit jury for inhabitants of the Hawaiian islands during
the interim period between annexation and formal incorporation); infra note 75. See generally BILL
ONG

HING,

MAKING

AND

REMAKING

ASIAN

AMERICA

THROUGH

IMMIGRATION

POLICY,

1850-1990 (1993).
75. This type of sentiment has previously been seen in U.S. society, for example during the
Japanese internment during World War II. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24 (recognizing
national security as a compelling government interest that provides for constitutional
discrimination). The challenges to the detainment of persons at Guanthnamo Bay, Cuba, also
indicate the tense rhetoric and legal differences in asserting claims of those who are viewed as a
security risk and "not American." See Sarah M. Riley, Comment, Constitutional Crisis or Dji Vu?
The War Power, the Bush Administration and the War on Terror, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 701 (2007);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,Substantive Rights, and the
War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007); see also Cam Simpson & Flynn McRoberts, U.S.
Ends Muslim Registry: Program that Profiled by Nationality Yielded no Terrorism Charges, CHI.
TRIB.,
Dec.
2,
2003,
available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/chi0312020136dec02,0,2821264.story (discussing the Department of Homeland Security's domestic
registration program implemented in summer 2002 and "largely scrapped" in December 2003).
76. See PEW HISPANIC CENTER/KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF
LATINOS (2002), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/15.pdf [hereinafter PEW HISPANIC CENTER,
2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS]; see also SHIRIN HAKIMZADEH & D"VERA COHN, PEW
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what connects Latinos to being part of the Latino group is in many ways
a source of discrimination in the United States.
Latinos' struggle for self identification reflects the history of Latinos
in the United States and is necessarily dependent on Latinos' national
origin countries' sovereignty and their relationships to the United
States.77 For example, a Puerto Rican is defined by the individual's
corresponding membership and connection to all Latinos in the United
States, but the individual's identification and status within the United
States is also determined by the relationship of Puerto Rico to the United
States as a Commonwealth, rather than a sovereign nation within Latin
America and the Latino Caribbean. 78 This type of experience is true for
all Latino subclasses. Mexicans constitute the largest Latino subclass,79
and they too are defined by who they are in the United States, as well as
by Mexico's relationship to the United States and the rest of Latin
America. 80 The group and country relationships define and set the
boundaries or borders of the individual's status and identification within
the United States. 1

HISPANIC CENTER, ENGLISH USAGE AMONG HISPANICS IN THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/82.pdf [hereinafter ENGLISH USAGE AMONG HISPANICS STUDY].
This Article argues that country of national origin is of consequential significance to many Latinos.
The Article does not explore whether the degree of significance varies amongst subclasses or
whether the degree of significance is related to any level of assimilation or acculturation.
77. See generally MORIN, supra note 12 (discussing the legal history of Latinos in the United
States and the relationship of particular national origin Latino subgroups to the United States).
78. Hemandez-Truyol, et al., supra note 56, at 187 n.89 (listing various articles discussing issues

of Latino/a identity as related to nationality and language).
79. BETSY GUZMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 2
(2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf [hereinafter HISPANIC POPULATION,

CENSUS 2000] (reporting that 58.5% of the Hispanic population identified as Mexican in the 2000
Census).
80. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 44; Hernndez, supra note 56.
81. See, e.g., The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L.
No. 105-100, Title II, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193, codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (legislating

disparate treatment based on nationality within the Central American nations for purposes of
eligibility for legal immigrant status).
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Latinos, like African Americans, have been racialized and colorized.82
They have also been classified according to their national origin and
their linguistic association with the Spanish language. 83 This has been
the experience of Latinos regardless of whether they have ever been
outside of the United States, whether they have multiple sources for their
national origin, and whether they speak any Spanish.84 While African
Americans and Latinos are defined by race and color, Latinos are also
categorized by country of national origin, language, accent, ethnicity,
and culture.85 A definition that continues to racialize the histories of
Latinos based on the history of Whites and people of African descent in
the United States limits the ability of the law to respond to
discrimination and inequality based on Latino identity. Such a definition
is also bound to remain contingent upon political restructuring of
Latinos' relationship to the United States.
The law treats race and those aspects of nationality that appear to
resemble race as prohibited classifications subject to strict scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause. 86 Under this doctrine, differential treatment
based on race and any national origin race surrogate that appears to act
like a race marker is subjected to strict scrutiny. However, this limited

82. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Mestizaje and the Mexican Mestizo Self: No Hay Sangre Negra, So
There is No Blackness, 15 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 199, 199-200 (2006) [hereinafter Mestizaje and
the Mexican Mestizo Sell] ("Throughout the twentieth century in the United States a person with any
known African ancestry is raced black.") (footnotes omitted) ; Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A
Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705 (2000); Taunya Lovell Banks, What is a
Community? Group Rights and the Constitution: The Special Case of African Americans, 1
MARGINS 51, 54-55 (2001); Leonard M. Baynes, If it's Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why
Does Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness?: An Investigation and
Analysis of the ColorHierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131 (1997) (exploring the impact ofcolorism
and the impact of a dark-light paradigm on African Americans and Latinos).
83. BEAN & TIENDA, supra note 38 at 36-55 (discussing how Latinos have been categorized
based on Spanish ancestry); RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE, infra note 35.

84. See, e.g., Luis Angel Toro, "A People Distinctfrom Others ": Race and Identity in Federal
Indian Law and the Hispanic Classificationin OMB Directive No. 15, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1219
(1995) (critiquing the census classification system as grouping persons based on a possible common
history of connection to Spanish language or culture).
85. It is the opinion of this author that in reality all persons in the United States are assessed
based on status (citizen, permanent resident) and language (English speaker), as well as race. As the
number of Blacks who are not U.S. citizens grows, certainly Blacks--who have historically been
defined based on race-will increasingly experience this same national origin categorization.
However, the categorization of Blacks will continue to be overshadowed by race, as demonstrated
by police brutality cases involving African and other non-White immigrants.
86. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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view of Latinos lacks consideration of significant national origin identity
markers. In addition to race, subclass affiliation and association with
country of national origin are significant to the inequality of Latinos in
society. Therefore, Latinos are entitled to this same strict scrutiny
these characteristics function or act as a
independent of whether
88
surrogate for race.
Latinos may experience discrimination because they are perceived to
be "Latinos" and because they are members of a national origin
subclassification based on country of ancestral origin. 89 Thus, an
individual of Puerto Rican, Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, or other Latin
American descent may experience different treatment not only because
the person is part of a Latino population within the United States, but
also because the person's ancestral roots are located within Latin
America or the Latino Caribbean. A constitutional doctrine that
presumes the suspect nature of national origin classifications must
consider this duality, as well as the roles of ethnicity, culture, language,
and history in defining national origin identity and experience.
Discriminatory treatment based on national origin classifications and
characteristics should not be presumptively suspect only when they are
surrogates for race. National origin characteristics, being Latino, and
being a member of a national origin subclass, also merit heightened
scrutiny.
An equal protection standard must incorporate an understanding of
categories that are the basis for equal and unequal treatment. Thus,
deciding who is included in the "Latino" category is a necessary first
step to legal analysis.
C.

Redefining Latinos

The relationship of Latinos to the United States has been marked by.
wars over land and strategic position, 90 distrust, 91 xenophobia,9 2 race,
88. See generally Hemandez-Truyol, et al., supra note 56; Toro, supra note 84; see also
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (affirming constitutionality of statute barring
states' denial of vote to persons educated in Puerto Rico).
89. See generally MORIN, supra note 12.
90. Prime examples are the various wars that the United States has fought or been involved in
throughout Latin America, including the Spanish-American War, which resulted in the United
States' conquest of Puerto Rico; battles with Mexico resulting in the annexation of parts of the
present South and Southwest-including Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas-as reflected
in such treaties as the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which ended the war between Mexico and the
United States in 1848; and invasions in the Caribbean in the Dominican Republic and Cuba. See
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ethnic and gender-based discrimination, 93 immigration policy that
adversely impacts Latino immigrants,9 4 and international agreements.95
All have influenced or been a consequence of government and general
public9 6 uncertainty about where Latinos "fit" into U.S. society. 97 The
United States' struggle to define "Latinos," or "Hispanics," reflects a
societal indeterminacy about persons who are of Latin American and
Latino Caribbean descent and a rejection of the role of Latinos in the
development of North America. 98 The more the United States struggles
with its own history of racial
to define "Latino," the more it struggles
99
and national origin-based oppression.

CHASTEEN, supra note 38, at 175.
91. Latino distrust of government and law enforcement is easily demonstrated by various
community reactions to police brutality and anti-immigration legislation. See MORIN, supra note 12,
at 95-110 (discussing experiences of police brutality and Latino community responses in New York
and Los Angeles). Private sector acts of employment discrimination based on language, ethnicity,
and gender also test Latino tolerance of unfair treatment. See, e.g., Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202
F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2000) (addressing a Title VII employment discrimination case by Latina claiming
discrimination based on gender and national origin wherein Latina physically defended herself from
the supervisor's harassment).
92. See, e.g., Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Coverture's
Diminishment, but Not Its Demise, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 153 (2004) (discussing gendered aspects of
U.S. immigration policy and its impact on immigrants, including Latinos and Latinas); Perea,
Demography and Distrust, supra note 7, at 350-77 (stating that language is national origin proxy
not recognized as discrimination).
93. See generally ANNETTE B. RAMIREZ DE ARELLANO, COLONIALISM, CATHOLICISM, AND
CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN PUERTO Rico (1983) (discussing U.S.sanctioned forced sterilization in Puerto Rico); Cruz, 202 F.3d 560 (addressing Title VII gender and
national origin employment discrimination case by Latina); Joe R. Feagin, Toward an Integrated
Theory of Systemic Racism, in THE CHANGING TERRAIN OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, 203, 217-19
(Maria Krysan & Amanda E. Lewis eds., 2004) (discussing impact of binary racist ideology on
Latinos and other people of color who are not African American).
94. See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2000 & Supp. V
2005); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (stating that
undocumented immigrant employees are not protected by U.S. labor laws and therefore cannot
recover relief in action against employer for violation of federal labor laws).
95. The North American Free Trade Agreement and the proposed Central American Free Trade
Agreement are only the most recent examples of international agreements between the United States
and Latin America. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993); Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001-4111 (2007)).
96. Here I refer to the non-Latino general population of the United States.
97. See supranotes 53, 56 & 88, and accompanying text.
98. See various articles by Taunya Lovell Banks, supra note 82.
99. See generally Delgado & Jean Stefancic, supra note 53.
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The complexity of defining who is a Latino is evident in the public
debate over whether to use the word "Latino" or the word "Hispanic" to
describe members of the class.100 Despite this debate over a homogenous
general title, data suggests that country-based subclassifications are most
relevant to those who would be included within the Latino category.'0 1
Latinos self identify with their individual or ancestral country of national
origin.'0 2 Consequently, persons of Latin American descent refer to
themselves according to their subclassification, such as Puerto Rican,
Mexican, Dominican, Cuban, or some combination. 0 3 These members
of the subclasses also self identify as members of a group-Latinoswith a shared language, culture, and history, based on a common
geographic and cultural affiliation.
The definition of Latino has also been subject to external exigencies,
such as the need to fit Latinos within a particular racial category for
purposes of differentiation. 10 4 Latinos contend with a particular racial
and ethnic genealogical history composed of indigenous, African,
Iberian, Asian, and European roots that took hold in Latin America and
the Caribbean. These roots continue to develop in the United States.
Latinos also face the tension between how they self identify-which
or varied color
may include a single racial category or a multiracial,
05
subclass.1
origin
national
their
categorization-and
Even a cursory review of the Census and scholarly examinations and
critiques of the Census reveals the contentious and unstable nature of
this "labeling" and "counting" project. 1 6 The Census has focused on
whether to classify Latinos as a specified race-namely White-or as an
ethnic group; whether to permit Latinos to self-identify as "Latinos,"
"Hispanics," or "Other"; or whether to permit Latinos to select a national
origin subgroup and a race. 10 7 For the 2000 Census, Latinos were

100. See, e.g., Christine Granado, 'Hispanic' vs. 'Latino': A New Poll Finds that the Tern
December
2000,
available at
'Hispanic' is Preferred, HISPANIC MAGAZINE,
http://www.hispaniconline.com/magazine/2000/dec/Features/latino.html.
101. See PEW HISPANIC CENTER, 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS, supra note 76.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. lan F. Haney L6pez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1997).
105. See RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE, supra note 35; see also Racusen, supra note 59, at 790.
106. RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE, supra note 35, at 101-04 (discussing how Latinos have been
variously classified in several U.S. Censuses).
107. ld.; see also MORIN, supra note 12, at 13.
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categorized under the ethnic group
"Hispanic" and also permitted to
10 8
category.
racial
separate
select a
This Census classification affects how Latinos are classified in
government reports, charts and summaries, wherein they are referred to
as "Hispanic," a potential member of any race.' 0 9 The ethnic/racial
categorization places all Latinos within a column usually labeled
"Hispanic, nonwhite" followed by a notation that "Persons whose
ethnicity is identified as Hispanic may be of any race." 110 This
racial/ethnic duality has spawned a new category: non-Hispanic
White. 11' As Latinos have been cast as a dual minority, Whites have
been placed within a category that secures racial privilege and further
anchors racial hierarchy to exclude Latinos from unambiguous White
categorization.
The legal and social construction that Latinos can be of any race,
except non-Hispanic White, appears even more groundless, given this
new categorization secured for Whites who are not ethnically Hispanic.
The designation of Latinos as capable of being of any race, which
implies that Latinos can be "White," ignores the political, cultural and
social histories of Latinos living in the United States, as well as the
consequences of these histories as represented in socio-economic
demographics. By most socio-economic measures, Latinos have fared
poorly compared with those in the "non-Hispanic White" race
category. 1 2 Even though a majority of Latinos who select a race self
108. U.S. Census Bureau, Persons of Hispanic or Latino Origin, percent, 2004,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/meta/long-309545.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2007) [hereinafter U.S.
Census Bureau, Persons of Hispanic or Latino Origin]. The 2000 Census provided the following
racial category selections: White, Black, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian
and Other Pacific Islander, Other. U.S. Census Bureau, USA QuickFacts from the US Census
Bureau (August 31, 2007), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.
109. See U.S. Census Bureau, Persons of Hispanic or Latino Origin, supra note 108.
110. See, e.g., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Status by Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity,
http://www.bls.gov/web/cpseeal 7.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
111. See U.S. Census Bureau, Persons of Hispanic or Latino Origin, supranote 108.
112. See id.; see also RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, LATINO LABOR REPORT, 2006:
STRONG GAINS IN EMPLOYMENT (2006), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/70.pdf (discussing the

delayed and slow decrease in Latino unemployment since its peak in mid 2003, although
improvement mostly driven by construction sector jobs); MEGAN ELLIOTT, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
LA
RAZA,
HISPANIC
WOMEN
AT
WORK,
(2005),
http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/detail/32940 (analyzing data on Latinas in the U.S.
workforce indicating that Latinas have lower annual incomes than their peers, have the lowest labor
force participation rate of all major U.S. racial and ethnic groups, and are two times more likely
than White women to be unemployed); ANGELA M. ARBOLEDA, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAZA,
LATINOS
AND
THE
FEDERAL
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
(July
2002),
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identify as "White," '1 13 various indicators of racial status and privilege
4

support the conclusion that in U.S. society Latinos are non-Whites.1
Latinos cannot simply "be of any race"--they cannot recreate
themselves as members of a privileged White race through selfidentification." 5 Latinos are perceived by Whites to be non-White, and
as a group, Latinos experience oppression and injustice not common to
Whites.11 6 Latinos do not share similar benefits and privileges to those
enjoyed by members of the White majority.'17

http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/detail/1414 (discussing the statistically disproportionate
number of Latinos in the criminal justice system, and noting that (1) the proportion of Latinos in
prison is three times their proportion of the national population, (2) Hispanic men between 25 and
29 years old were three times as likely as Whites to be in prison, and (3) one in four of the federal
inmate prison population in 1997 was Hispanic).
113. TAFOYA, infra note 121 (noting nearly half-forty-eight percent-of Hispanics reported
White as their race on the 2000 Census); see also Census Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin,
supra note 100, at 10 (reporting nine out often Hispanics select either White or Other in response to
racial identity on the census). See generally Ian F. Haney Lbpez, White by Law, in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 626 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); john a.
powell, A Minority-Majority Nation: Racing the Population in the Twenty-First Century, 29
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1395, 1408 (2002) (forty-eight percent of Hispanics self-identified as White in
2000) (citing Orlando Patterson, Editorial, Race by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2001 at A27).
114. While Latinos' experiences may not be similar to those of Whites, Latinos arc at times
perceived as "non Black," which in a racial hierarchy based on color as well as race-as is the case
in the United States--may have some incremental value for those treated as non-White rather than
Black. See powell, supra note 113, at 1413 (proposing that racial subordination and white
supremacy be considered on a white/non-white and black/non-black paradigm); Baynes, supra note
82 (discussing survey indicating positive perceptions associated with lighter color skin
pigmentation); see also RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE, supra note 35, at 129-130 (discussing
Hispanics and the U.S. Census). See generally Jenny Rivera, The Availability of Domestic Violence
Services for Latinas in New York State. Phase II Investigation, 21 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 37 (2003);
Jenny Rivera, Extra! Extra! Read All About it: What Plaintiff "'Knowsor Should Know " Based on
Officials' Statements and Media Coverage of Police Misconduct for Notice of a § 1983 Municipal
Liability Claim, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 505 (2000); Jenny Rivera, PreliminaryReport: Availability
of Domestic Violence Services for Latina Survivors in New York State, 16 IN PUB. INTEREST 1
(1997-1998); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of
Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (1994).
115. While I do not believe that Latinos can be of any race for purposes of privileged status
acquisition, it is nonetheless historically true, at times, that Latinos have been "raced" as "White."
See generally RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE, supra note 35; Haney L6pez, supra note 113.
However, racing Latinos as White simultaneously benefits non-Hispanic Whites by reinforcing the
privileged status of "Whiteness."
116. See supra note 114. Latinos are viewed by the general public as non-Whites. See, e.g.,
Anushka Asthana, Changing Face of Western Cities: Migration Within the U.S. Makes Whites a
Minority in 3 More Cities, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2003, at A03 (discussing influx of Hispanics to
Phoenix, Tucson and Denver was reason, along with "white flight," for decrease in White
population).
117. See U.S. Census Bureau, Minority Links, Facts on the Hispanic or Latino Population,
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This classification also reinforces and maintains race as a significant
and valid aspect of Latinos' identity within the ethnic and national origin
category. This dual identity is a racialization 1 8 of the Latino population
which reveals and helps foster the Latino struggle for racial privilege,
whereby Latinos seek to attain the "White race" label, while
simultaneously securing the "ethnic/national origin" category. This dual
strategy allows Latinos to distance themselves from the "Black race"
11 9
label, in order to thwart efforts to treat Latinos as "non-White." '
Historically, Latinos gained some ground in their efforts to be labeled
White. 120 The race to be part of, or to be the other, "White race" is
illustrated by Latino self-identification as Whites on the Census 1and
in
21
discourse.
popular
Latino
within
White
being
with
their affiliation
Despite this ongoing struggle over racial position and the majority of
Latinos' self-identification as White, Latinos are still considered
"foreign" persons who speak a language other than English,
notwithstanding characterizations of "looking" White. 122 The public
http://www.census.gov/pubinfo/www/NEWhispMLl.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2007); ROBERTO R.
RAMIREZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE: HISPANICS IN THE UNITED STATES, CENSUS
2000 SPECIAL REPORTS 10 (2004), http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr-18.pdf; see also
supranotes 38, 53 & 114.
118. This racialization has historical roots and, as discussed supra Part IB, has effects that
continue to shape the experiences of Latinos in and outside the United States. See MORIN, supra
note 12, at 40.
The racialization of Latin Americans as racially inferior not only served to justify U.S.
conquests and policies, it helped rationalize the subsequent subordination of Mexicans and
Puerto Ricans in the United States, establishing the pattern of treatment for Latinos/as who
followed ....[T]his racialized image of Latin Americans formed the basis for prejudice and
discrimination for all other Latinas and Latinos. Id.
119. See Mestizaje and the Mexican Mestizo Self supra note 82, at 201.
120. See, e.g., Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange County, 64 F. Supp. 544, 545-46
(S.D. Cal. 1946), affid, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947) (noting that the parties conceded that there was
"no question of race discrimination" in the plaintiffs' challenge of a school segregation ordinance
whereby 'persons of Mexican or Latin descent or extraction' were segregated from White or AngloSaxon children); powell, supra note 113, at 1408 (noting that 1940 Census required all census
interviewers to report all Mexicans as White unless interviewer observed the individual was of
another race).
121. A study by the Pew Hispanic Center found evidence that Latinos self identify as White and
that for Latinos "[fqeeling white seems to be a reflection of success and a sense of inclusion."
SONYA TAFOYA, PEW HISPANIC CENTER SHADES OF BELONGING 3 (2004) available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/35.pdf. A recent empirical study also reveals thata significant
number of Whites recognize that they constitute a racial group, but also believe that they had "a
culture that should be preserved." Hartmann et al., supra note 52, at 21.
122. See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and
Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1, 25 (2007) ("Latinos, Asian Americans and Native
Americans are stamped as inherently 'exotic' or 'foreign."'). Robinson goes on to note that Latino
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reactions to current proposed immigration legislation illustrate the
precarious and contingent position of Latinos in the United States,
especially for those who associate directly with their countries of
national origin.'23
As part of the anti-Latino rhetoric, Latino immigrants have been
recast from the positive immigrant stereotype of hardworking,
underpaid, low-wage laborers, to the negative stereotype of subversives
who steal jobs from12 4hardworking "real" Americans, and who are
criminals to be feared.
actors "who speak fluent English ... report being told to 'fake a Spanish accent to be more
convincingly Hispanic."' Id..
123. See Robert Pear, Failure of Senate Immigration Bill Can Be Lesson for Congress, Experts
Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A 13 (noting conservative Republican senators saw the demise of
a 2007 immigration bill as evidence that "lawmakers had heeded public opinion"); see also Randal
C. Archibold, Reactions Run Gamut, but Immigrants Work On, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at Al
(reporting the responses and perspectives of various immigrant workers and advocacy groups in the
aftermath of the failed immigration reform defeated in Congress); Julia Preston, Immigration is at
Center of New Laws Around U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at A12 (recognizing a surge in state
legislature consideration and subsequent enactment of immigration laws "[s]purred by rising
resentment in the country over illegal immigration and by the collapse of a broad immigration bill in
the Senate in June").
After participants in the public marches and demonstrations against the legislation initially
carried and waved flags from different Latin American countries, there was an immediate and
visceral negative reaction, articulated in some conservative media outlets. See Clarence Page, The
Foreign Flag Rule, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 14, 2006, at IIA. In response, protestors replaced the
flags of different countries with U.S. flags. Id.; see also Charles Krauthammer, Editorial,
Immigrants Must Choose, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2006, at A 17. Demonstrators went out of their way

to publicly proclaim their loyalty, love for and affiliation with the United States. By carrying the
U.S. flag, the demonstrators sought to gain public support by distancing themselves from their
countries of national origin.
124. RUBEN G. RUMBAUT, ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF
IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY: IMPRISONMENT AMONG FIRST-AND SECOND-GENERATION YOUNG MEN

(2006), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=403 (discussing how public
opinion and policy historically have been based on stereotypes of immigrants as criminals, and
illustrating that high-level political leaders share these views; quoting U.S. President George W.
Bush's May 15, 2006 address to the nation, wherein he stated that "[i]llegal immigration puts
pressure on public schools and hospitals, it strains state and local budgets, and brings crime to our
communities"). Although the anti-immigrant, anti-Latino rhetoric was particularly vitriolic in 2006,
data indicates that these are long-standing, broadly held public opinions about immigrants. The
2000 General Social Survey indicated that in the sample of adults surveyed and asked:
whether 'more immigrants cause higher crime rates,' twenty-five percent said 'very likely' and
another forty-eight percent 'somewhat likely'-that is, about three-fourths (seventy-three
percent) believed that immigration was causally related to more crime. That was a much higher
proportion than the sixty percent who believed that 'more immigrants were [somewhat or very]
likely to cause Americans to lose jobs,' or the fifty-six percent who thought that 'more
immigrants were [somewhat or very] likely to make it harder to keep the country united.'

Id.
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As the discussion above regarding labeling, self-identification and the
Census reveals, Latinos are indeed perceived as a racial group, but
Latinos are also perceived as and labeled an ethnic and national origin
group. 25 The common thread running through all of these
categorizations is that Latinos are not part of the United States, or
"American."' 126 Instead, Latinos are often viewed as recent immigrants
undeserving of legal protections and as a linguistic minority unwilling to
assimilate and learn English. 27 As discussed below, that position is
similarly reflected in affirmative action case law.
D.

The RacializedLatino Paradox

Jurists have struggled to categorize Latinos within a legal framework.
Judges and Supreme Court Justices have traditionally defined Latinos
mostly by comparison to African Americans, rather than by delineating
the histories and experiences of Latinos. 128 While the relationship of
Latinos to the United States and to non-Latino Whites is one of
oppression and domination marred by racial privilege, Latinos'
experiences are also grounded in the centrality of national origin status
and language. The Courts have yet to adequately develop a legal equal
protection analysis that sufficiently addresses the role of these aspects of
Latino and Latino subclass identity.
As discussed in this Article, the current legal framework is inadequate
to address these issues. What is surprising, perhaps, is the extent to
which the current framework obstructs Latinos' struggle for equality
under the law. Current legal analysis limits legal remedies available to
Latinos for claims of29national origin discrimination based on national
origin characteristics. 1

125. See supra note 53.

126. See supra note notes 83-85 for citations and accompanying text. The rejection of Latinos as
authentically "American" is not only ahistorical but ironic. Latinos were landowners and inhabitants
of parts of what are today the United States before annexation of those lands. Ramdn A. Guti6rrez,
Mexican-Origin People In the United States, in 3 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATINOS &
LATINAS IN THE UNITED STATES 129-38 (Suzanne Oboler & Deena J. Gonzalez eds., 2005); see
also Ronald Takaki, "Occupied" Mexico, in THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER
152-54 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998).
127. See Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
965, 981-91 (1995).
128. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text, and infra Part Ill.
129. See supra Part 1.B and accompanying notes (presenting the construction and racialization of

Latino identity).

The Context That Matters
To the extent Latinos demonstrate and assimilate American historical
and social characteristics-including English language skills or English
monolingualism, affiliation with the United States as country of origin
and nationality, adoption of cultural mores of individualism, and
privilege hierarchies built on racial categories and racial
stereotypes-Latinos' claims to protected category status under the law
become more precarious. 130 As Latinos are perceived to be more like
"Americans"--read "White Americans"--the less likely Latinos are to
benefit from affirmative action programs designed to address the needs
of racial groups that are not treated equally to White Americans.
Paradoxically, the less "American" that Latinos are perceived to be by
society, the less likely it is that law protects Latinos for discrimination
based on national origin characteristics because these characteristics are
perceived as no longer relevant or a basis for discrimination that needs to
be remedied. Thus, Latinos perceived by society as appearing more like
"real" Americans, and Latinos perceived as undocumented immigrants
who are not Americans, have limited legal recourse based on Latino
identity and national origin affiliation. In either case, Latinos are left
without a way of communicating their experiences of national origin
discrimination unless they reference race or a race surrogate. Without
such a surrogate, English language acquisition, American culture
adaptation, and U.S. citizenship do not ensure full protection under the
law against discrimination.
Cases involving assertions of national origin discrimination claims
based on language are prime examples of this paradox.' 13 In these cases
bilingual and monolingual Spanish-speaking Latinos were unable to seek
legal recourse against language-based discrimination, because language
32
discrimination was not recognized as unlawful bias.
130. Paula M. L. Moya provides a thought-provoking analysis of the detrimental aspects of
assimilation and promoting the alternative of being asimilao, whereby groups and individuals
"adapt to their new surroundings by retaining some values and cultural practices and by changing
others-absorbing other ways of being in the world from among the various cultural groups they
come into contact with." Paula M. L. Moya, Cultural ParticularityVersus Universal Humanity, in
HISPANICS/LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES: ETHNICITY, RACE, AND RIGHTS 77, 89 (Jorge J. E.

Gracia & Pablo De Greiffeds., 2000) (referring to JUAN FLORES, "'Queassimilated, brother, yo soy
asimilao ": The Structuring of Puerto Rican Identity in the U.S, in DIVIDED BORDERS: ESSAYS ON
PUERTO RICAN IDENTITY 191-92 (1993)).
131. See infra Part Ill.
132. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participation, 94 CAL. L. REV. 687, 688-89
(2006) [hereinafter Rodriguez, Language and Participation] (describing various disputes over
English-only requirements involving Latinos and attempts to speak Spanish, specifically a judicial
decision based on language skills in child custody cases, a Little League English-only rule, a
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In Hernandez v. New York, 13 3 the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that exclusion of prospective bilingual Latino jurors that was
134
based solely on language constituted an equal protection violation.
The Court concluded that the prosecutor's exclusion of bilingual Latinos
from the jury through the use of peremptory challenges was based on a
valid, race-neutral concern that bilingual jurors would not follow the
As the
official translation of Spanish-language trial testimony.'
plaintiffs and the dissent noted, this use of preemptory challenges would
lead to the systematic exclusion of Latinos since Latinos speak or
understand Spanish in disproportionate numbers, compared to the
general population and the population of the venire. 136 It also means that
Latinos who are eligible to serve because they speak English are the
most likely to be struck from the pool. The majority noted the apparent
"harsh paradox" created by its decision: "one may become proficient
enough in English to participate in trial, only to encounter
disqualification because he knows a second language as well."' 137 Of
38
course, since English language skills are required to serve on juries,1
this requirement leaves as eligible to serve only those Latinos who are
neither bilingual nor monolingual
in Spanish. This is a small percentage
139
population.
Latino
the
of
Other examples of this paradox extend beyond constitutional equal
protection claims and are found in employment discrimination cases
involving bilingual Latino employees who allege that employer rules
mandating that only English be spoken at the workplace constitute
national origin discrimination in violation of Title* VII.140 In several of
these cases bilingual employees' claims have been dismissed because
the courts have concluded that since they can speak English they have
landlord/tenant dispute, and an English-only rule in a public high school).
133. 500 U.S. 352 (1990).
at 362.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 361, 367-68.
136. Id. at 359, 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pet'r's Br. at 7.
137. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 (internal citation omitted).
138. See, e.g., N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 510 (McKinney 2003) (New York English language
requirement to serve on juries in state court).
139. ROBERTO R. RAMIREZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE: HISPANICS IN THE UNITED
STATES, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS 10 (2004), http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr-

18.pdf.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (prohibits discrimination in the workplace based on national
origin); see Rodriguez, Language and Participation,supra note 132, at 754-57 (discussing adverse
impact of English-only workplace rules on bilingual and non-English speaking employees).
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not suffered discrimination.' 4' This reasoning leaves this class of
individuals with claims only for discrimination based on their being
perceived as part of a national origin group-as people who are
perceived as not fully American.
At the other end of the spectrum are cases which deny Latino workers
some of the rights afforded to other workers.142 In these cases, Latinos
based on language acquisition or immigrant status are denied equal
protection under the laws. 143 The courts have concluded there is no
group-based constitutional denial of equal protection by providing
information solely in English; 144 thus, Latinos most in need of Spanish
language services and information can be denied such information
without recourse in the courts.
These different types of cases, involving on the one hand challenges
against differential treatment in the employment context of Latinos who
speak and understand English, and on the other challenges against
providers of services who deny necessary information to those who do
not sufficiently understand English or have no English language
acquisition, illustrate the range of analyses applied to Latino claims of
discrimination. The cases indicate that judges perceive bilingual Latinos
as unable to establish discrimination based on national origin if they
45
acquire English language skills or have no Spanish language skills.,
Latinos in this category would be the most familiar with and perhaps
most assimilated to U.S. culture. Yet, Latinos who, in these cases, do not
have sufficient English language acquisition, who may have vulnerable
immigrant status, and who are perceived as not fully American, similarly
do not have uniform legal protection for their participation in U.S.
society. Indeed, they are the most vulnerable to abuse.
As this discussion illustrates, the more Latinos associate linguistically
and culturally with their country of national origin they experience fewer

141. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993); Garcia v. Gloor,
618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980).
142. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002) (holding
that undocumented employees who are not legally authorized to work in the United States are not
eligible for back pay awards for employer's violation of labor laws).

143. See, e.g., id.
144. See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (English-only social
security information does not result in group discrimination against Hispanics); Carmona v.
Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1973) (English-only unemployment benefit notices do not
deny Latinos equal protection).
145. See supra note 144.
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rights and more negative outcomes under the law. 46 Yet, disassociation
from country of national origin does not necessarily secure greater rights
147
or the full range of rights available to non-Latino White U.S. citizens.
Categorization as "Latino" and association with country of national
origin are critical legal constructs.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CLASSIFICATIONS

The Equal Protection Clause prohibits laws or government practices
that distinguish impermissibly between classes of persons. 148 The
Constitution requires that government not discriminate, but does not
require or permit government to remedy general, unspecified societal
discrimination. 149 Societal discrimination, as a general matter, cannot be
challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 50 Where
government has discriminated, however, government and the courts may
fashion a remedy to address those injured by the discrimination.' 5'
Federal, state, and local governments have implemented affirmative
action programs to address discrimination against various classes of
people who have historically been the subjects of discrimination,
including Latinos.' 52 These programs have been challenged as

146. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 140; see also supra notes 7 & 9 (discussing
examples of Court-sanctioned denial of services and legal remedial benefits).
147. The continued economic and political status of African Americans illustrates how difficult it
can be to attain equality even without obstacles related to linguistic or citizenship status.
Assimilation and acculturation in no sense provide a secure position of privilege for sexual
minorities. See generally Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75
TEMPLE L. REV. 709 (2002), 712-13, 731-33 (discussing the constitutional implications of
assimilation as an anti-equality theorem and challenging progressive constructions of assimilation).
148. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883).
149. Id. (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits discriminatory action by the
state); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it constitutes
discriminatory state action); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1972) (holding
that a state's liquor regulatory scheme, as applied to discriminatory club, did not constitute state
discrimination for Fourteenth Amendment purposes); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 619-24 (1991) (distinguishing between state and private discrimination and providing a
test for determining what constitutes impermissible state action under the Fourteenth Amendment).
150. See, e.g., Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding a district court order
that set a numerical goal for the promotion of black troopers in a state police department).
152. JOmN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 803, 826 (7th ed. 2004).
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unconstitutional

by persons

not covered by the

program."'

The

challengers argue that the law unconstitutionally benefits certain classes
of people54over others and that they have been excluded from coverage as
1

a result.

A.

The Supreme Court's Equal ProtectionJurisprudence

The Supreme Court defined the contours of its equal protection
standard as applied to affirmative action programs in cases involving

access to government contracts for applicants defined according to race,
national origin, and gender. Following its seminal decisions in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 155 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.

Pena,'56 for over a decade the Court has subjected government "racial
classifications" contained in affirmative action programs to strict judicial
scrutiny, requiring that the classifications "are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests. ' 5 7 The courts
have applied strict scrutiny to affirmative action cases based on national
origin.1
Challengers to affirmative action programs for minority-owned
businesses have generally asserted that the government classification
violates the equal protection clauses of the Constitution because the
59
government cannot justify its classification on the basis of race.'
Claimants have alleged that the government cannot establish that the

153. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan
Law School's affirmative action program in admissions).
154. Id. (The plaintiff, Grutter, was a white female Michigan resident.).
155. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
156. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
157. Id. at 227; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 486; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
285 (1986).
158. See Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N. Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, at 204 (2d Cir.
2006) (stating that the plaintiff must allege intentional discrimination based on race or national
origin in order for strict scrutiny to apply to the plaintiffs equal protection claim) (citing
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)); Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d
Cir. 1999)).
The focus of this Article is an equal protection standard for national origin classifications without
consideration to gender. Notably the Court has subjected gender discrimination to a less demanding
standard than race or national origin discrimination. Classifications based on gender must have an
"exceedingly persuasive" justification, and serve "important governmental objectives." United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). The possible implications
for a hybrid legal analysis involving women of color is beyond the scope of this Article.
159. See infra Part III.
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classification is necessary to remedy past discrimination, or that the
means chosen is not 1sufficiently
narrow or limited in scope to fit the
60
governmental interest.
1.

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.

In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Court held that
governmental affirmative action programs are subject to strict
scrutiny. 16 ' In the Croson case, Richmond, Virginia's City Council
adopted a minority business plan applicable to the construction industry,
intended to increase the amount of City-awarded contract dollars that
went to Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs) by setting aside thirty
percent of the dollar value of its contracts to MBEs. 162 The City defined
an MBE as a business where "at least fifty-one (51) percent of which is
owned and controlled ... by minority group members,"'' 63 defined as
"citizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking,
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts."' 164 A construction company
challenged the plan after the City rejected its bid on a City contract
65
because it did not meet the MBE requirement.1
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that all race classifications are subject
to strict scrutiny equal protection review, regardless of legislative intent,
and that generalized allegations of discrimination--even with proof of
nationwide discrimination-are insufficient to establish the necessary
quantum of discrimination that justifies a race-based remedial
program. 166 The Court concluded that the City failed to establish that the
plan served a compelling governmental interest and that it was narrowly
67
tailored to remedy effects of prior discrimination. 1

160. See infra Part Ill.
161. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
162. Id. at 478.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 481-83.

166. Id. at 493-94, 500. "Racial classifications are suspect, and that means that simple legislative
assurances of good intention cannot suffice .... But when a legislative body chooses to employ a
suspect classification, it cannot rest upon a generalized assertion as to the classification's relevance
to its goals." Id. at 500.
167. Id. at 500, 507.
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2.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena

In Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, the Court considered whether
strict scrutiny applied to a federal affirmative action program's
categories of beneficiaries. 168 Adarand involved an equal protection
challenge169 to a federally-funded highway contracts program that
sought to increase the number of small business subcontractors
controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."' 7 °
The Small Business Act set a minimum participation goal for small
businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals" of five percent of the total value of all prime and sub
contract awards in a fiscal year. 171 Under the law, the government
presumed that
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include[d]
Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans,
Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities, or any other
individual found to be disadvantaged by the [Small Business]
Administration pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small Business
Act. 172
Presumptions were rebuttable by a third party's "evidence suggesting
is not, in fact, either economically or socially
that the participant
73
disadvantaged."'
168. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-25 (1995).
169. The Supreme Court restated in Adarand that its analysis of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claims are the same, and that Fifth Amendment-based equal protection claims are
subject to the same standards as those asserted under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 217-18 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, n.2 (1975); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166, n.16 (1987) (plurality
opinion of Brennan, J.) (internal quotations omitted)).
170. Id. at 204.
171. Id. at 206 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §644(g)(1)).
172. Id. at 205 (citation omitted). The Small Business Act (SBA) defines "socially disadvantaged
individuals" as persons "who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias
because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual qualities." 15
U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (2006). The SBA defines "economically disadvantaged individuals" as "socially
disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired
due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same business area
who are not socially disadvantaged." Id. §637(a)(6)(A).
The Court noted that SBA's subcontracting program, set forth in section 8(d) of the statute, was
subject to regulations that stated, "members of minority groups wishing to participate in the 8(d)
subcontracting program are entitled to a race-based presumption of social and economic
disadvantage." Adarand, 515 U.S. at 207-08 (citing 48 C.F.R. §§ 19.001, 19.703(a)(2) (1994)).
173. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 208 (citing 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.11 l(c)-(d), 124.601-124.609 (1994)).
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The federal government awarded Mountain Gravel & Construction
Company the prime contract for a highway construction project in
Colorado in 1989.174 Mountain Gravel thereafter solicited bids for a
subcontract on the project, and Adarand Contractors submitted the
lowest subcontract bid. Mountain Gravel rejected this bid and instead
75
accepted the bid submitted by Gonzalez Construction Company.
According to its prime contract terms with the federal government,
Mountain Gravel would receive additional compensation for hiring
subcontractors "certified as small businesses controlled by 'socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals."", 176 Mountain Gravel rejected
Adarand's bid because Adarand was not certified as a "socially and
economically disadvantaged individual.' 7 7 Adarand challenged the
statute as discriminatory, claiming that the presumption of disadvantage
for persons listed in the statute based on race constituted an equal
78
protection violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The Court concluded that racial classifications by any federal, state or
local government actor are subject to strict scrutiny and can only survive
a challenge if the classification is narrowly tailored to further a
compelling governmental interest. 179 An express classification, plain on
the face of the legislation, is "inherently suspect,"1 80 and requires that the
government establish a compelling interest and that the classification is
narrowly tailored to further such interest.1 8' The Court did not decide
whether the federal government had or could establish a compelling
interest, or had designed a program narrowly tailored to meet that
interest. Instead, the Court remanded so the lower courts could decide
the matter after proper application of the strict scrutiny test. 181

174. Id. at 205.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citation omitted).
177. Id. at 205. Gonzales Construction Company was certified as a small business controlled by
"socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." Id. at 205.
178. Id. at 204-06.
179. Id. at 235.
180. Id. at 223 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)).
181. Id. at 219-21.

182. Id. at 237-39 (remanding for further proceedings as Court of Appeals had erroneously
applied intermediate scrutiny).
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B.

Overinclusive and Underinclusive Programs

The Court has expressed concern with programs that are
overinclusive because they provide remedial relief to individuals who
have not been discriminated against, as well as those that are
underinclusive for failing to include individuals who have suffered
discrimination. In Croson, the Court rejected the government affirmative
action plan in part because the government had included persons from
groups which it failed to establish had suffered past discrimination in the
Richmond, Virginia construction industry.' 83 The government thus did
not establish that the affirmative action plan was solely implemented to
address past discrimination (the compelling government interest prong),
nor did the government show that the classifications were narrowly
tailored to address the alleged discrimination in the 84Richmond
construction industry (the narrowly-tailored program prong).
The Supreme Court's decision in Adarand held that government
affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny, 85 but it did not
address whether strict scrutiny or some other standard of review applied
to subclassifications within the constitutionally challenged group
categories-for example when a state defines Latinos as including all
Spanish-speaking persons with Latin American or Caribbean ancestry
but excludes Spaniards or those whose ancestors are from Spain-or
whether review of such classifications was encompassed within the
narrow-tailored prong of strict scrutiny. Given that subclassifications are
often a part of definitions of large ethnic group classifications in
affirmative action legislation, the level of scrutiny required is a
significant legal issue. Indeed, as discussed in this article there have
been challenges to the exclusion and inclusion of particular national
within the larger classification in
origin groups from subclassifications
1 86
the remedial program.

The question remains whether, once government makes the initial
choice to implement such a program and provide for group-based
assistance, the subclass definitions are similarly subject to strict scrutiny,
183. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989) (plurality opinion).
184. See id.
185. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
186. See infra Part 1l.A (discussing Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev.,
438 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2006), in which the statute at issue was challenged on underinclusiveness
grounds as it did not include persons of direct Spanish and Portuguese descent in its definition of
"Latino").
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subject to a lesser standard of review, or absolved from further review.
For example, if a governmental actor decided to include in the Latino
classification everyone with Latin American ancestry and excluded
Spaniards, would that be subject to strict scrutiny analysis, rational basis
analysis, or intermediate scrutiny--or would the court simply defer to
legislative wisdom? Although Croson and Adarand do not directly
address this question, they provide guidance as to how the Court would
decide if presented with a direct challenge to a subclassification. In these
two cases, the Court considered the parameters of the classifications as
relevant to both prongs of the strict scrutiny inquiry. 187 It would be
contrary to Supreme Court precedent to subject broad classifications to
strict scrutiny but apply some lesser standard of review to
subclassifications that set forth the defining characteristics of the broad
classifications. The government would be able to subvert the Supreme
Court's directive that all classifications be justified by an important
governmental goal and be designed to "fit" that goal merely by using
subclassifications that include persons who would not otherwise satisfy
both prongs of strict scrutiny,' 88 or by excluding persons who satisfy the
requirements and who, but for the government's definition, otherwise
meet the goals of the affirmative action plan.
III.

EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMS

This section discusses seven circuit court decisions that have analyzed
subclassifications as part of their review of an equal protection challenge
to a government-sponsored minority-owned business affirmative action
program.1 89 As discussed further in this section, the inadequacies of the
approaches adopted in these decisions are primarily due to the courts'
reliance on race-based equal protection jurisprudence and the courts'

187. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 234-37; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-508.
188. See infra Part III (several circuits have considered whether affirmative action programs are
overinclusive in their selection of racial and ethnic groups. This Article contends that the decisions
in these cases do not properly analyze national origin subclassifications under the Equal Protection

Clause).
189. Jana-Rock, 438 F.3d 195; Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d
642 (7th Cir. 2001); Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir.
2000) (Drabik); Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997); Peightal v. Metro.
Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (Peightal 11); O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of
Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394 (11th
Cir. 1991) (Peightal I).
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attempt to compare national origin subclassifications to race-based
categories. The cases cover approximately fifteen years, with the most
recent decision issued in 2006 and the earliest in 1991.190 All were
decided post-Croson, 91 and four were decided post-Adarand.192 The

majority of these circuits analyzed subclassifications as part of the
narrow-tailoring prong of strict scrutiny.193 Half of these circuits also
assessed subclassifications as part of their determinations that the
program was "overinclusive." 194 The Second, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits considered whether the subclassifications were so specifically
underinclusive as to render the programs unconstitutional.19 5 One of
these circuits applied rational basis to the subclassification challenge, but
left open the possibility that a claimant could persuade the court to apply
strict scrutiny if the claimant established that there was intentional
discrimination by the government. 196 Thus, the court adopted a type of
flexible equal protection analysis to subclassifications.
Neither
of
these
approaches-overinclusiveness
nor
underinclusiveness-adequately addresses the issues raised by an equal
protection challenge to national origin subclassifications. National origin
groups are not necessarily coextensive with racial groups, and national
origin groups have histories of oppression and disempowerment that do
not necessarily track those of racial groups. 97 While exclusion from
programs benefiting individuals and denial of access to policymaking
positions are common experiences for all minority and disempowered
groups-whether categorized by race, national origin, or ethnicitythere are individual and community experiences that do not always
overlap among members of these groups. These experiences constitute
histories that merge for national origin and ethnic groups, expand and

190. See supranote 189.
191. The seven cases were decided between 1991 and 2005, see supra note 189, and Croson was
decided in 1989, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
192. Jana-Rock,Builders, Drabik, and Monterey Mech. were decided after the Adarand decision
in 1995.
193. Builders, 256 F.3d at 647; Drabik, 214 F.3d at 740; Monterey Mech., 125 F.3d at 714;
O'Donnell, 963 F.2d at 427; Peightal11, 26 F.3d at 1560-61; Peightal1, 940 F.2d at 1408-10.
194. Builders, 256 F.3d at 647; Monterey Mech., 125 F.3d at 714; O'Donnell, 963 F.2d at 427.
195. Jana-Rock, 438 F.3d at 212-14; Drabik, 214 F.3d at 737; Peightal1!,26 F.3d at 1560-61;
Peightal1, 940 F.2d at 1408-10.
196. Jana-Rock, 438 F.3d at 211.
197. See generally MORIN, supra note 12; RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE, supra note 35.
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contract for subclasses within these groups, and overlap or diverge from
other group categories.
To the extent that these histories, commonalities and dissimilarities
are relevant to equal protection doctrine, 198 the circuit court decisions
discussed below have not adequately considered the legal import of
subclassifications. The cases are discussed in reverse chronological
order, beginning with the most recent decision.
A.

Jana-Rock Construction, Inc. v. New York State Department of
Economic Development

In Jana-Rock Construction, Inc. v. New York State Department of
Economic Development,'9 9 the Second Circuit concluded that the
rational basis test, rather than strict scrutiny, applied in an equal
protection challenge to the State's statutory definition of "Hispanic" in
its minority-owned business affirmative action program. 20 0 The Second
Circuit developed a "flexible" equal protection standard of review that
presumptively applies strict scrutiny to all challenges to race, national
origin, and ethnic categories, but subjects challenges to national origin
and ethnic category subclassifications to rational basis review. 20 1 The
Second Circuit approach allows the plaintiff to argue for more rigorous
review, but in so doing shifts the burden to the plaintiff to establish
discriminatory motive in the choice to exclude a specific national origin
subclass.20 2
The plaintiff in Jana-Rock claimed that the State of New York's
definition of "Hispanic" violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause because New York did not include persons of Spanish
or Portuguese descent in its definition.20 3 The definition thus excluded
him as he was the "the son of a Spanish mother whose parents were born
in Spain., 20 4 Under New York's minority-owned business program,
198. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989) (exploring the history of

discrimination against particular groups relevant to determination of whether program is narrowly
tailored to compensate for past discrimination).
199. 438 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2006).
200. Seeid. at 212.
201. Id. at 210.
202. Id. at 211.
203. Id.at 199.

204. Id.(quotation omitted). The State argued that although the plaintiff had previously been
certified and recertified several times as a minority business enterprise, the intention was to certify
the plaintiff for the federal minority-owned affirmative action business program with the U.S.
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"[h]ispanic[s]" are defined as "persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican,
Dominican, Cuban, Central or South American [sic] of either Indian or
Hispanic origin, regardless of race., 20 5 The plaintiff did not challenge
the program as wholly unconstitutional. The plaintiff-presumptively in
order to participate in the program-conceded that New York had a
compelling government interest to address discrimination against
Hispanics, and that the program otherwise was narrowly tailored to
address this interest.2 °6
The Second Circuit divided the plaintiffs underinclusiveness
challenge into two alternative arguments, and rejected both. Under the
first argument, the court interpreted the plaintiffs challenge to demand
application of strict scrutiny to New York's program on the ground that
the program generally is underinclusive.2 °7 This argument would require
New York to justify its decision not to remedy discrimination against
groups excluded from its classifications. 20 8 The court rejected this
argument, concluding that the State did not have to establish why
excluded groups do not merit inclusion in its program. 20 9 According to
the court, to hold otherwise would permit a plaintiff to proceed with a
challenge under strict scrutiny based on the government program's
alleged underinclusiveness, an outcome incompatible with the Supreme
Court's narrow-tailoring requirement. 210 It appears the Second Circuit
believed that since the narrow-tailoring prong of strict scrutiny seeks to
avoid overinclusiveness, it would be illogical to assume that a state's
effort to establish an underinclusive program was similarly
constitutionally infirm.
Department of Transportation (USDOT), not the state program. Pursuant to state law, and in
accordance with federal requirements, the State ensures compliance with the federal USDOT
minority-owned business affirmative action program and, to that end, certifies minority owned
businesses. Id. at 201--02.
205. N.Y. EXEC. § 310(8)(b) (McKinney 2005). The State of New York, however, certified the
plaintiff in Jana-Rock for participation in the federal USDOT minority-owned business program.
Jana-Rock, 438 F.3d at 202. The USDOT implemented regulations which define "Hispanic
Americans," a category under the federal program, as "persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban,
Dominican, Central or South American, or other Spanish or Portuguese culture or origin, regardless
of race." 49 C.F.R. § 26.5 (2006).
206. Jana-Rock, 438 F.3d at 206-10.
207. Id. at 205.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 206.
210. Id. at 207. ("Evaluating underinclusiveness as a prong of strict scrutiny would be
incompatible with the Supreme Court's requirement that affirmative action programs be no broader
than demonstrably necessary.").
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The second argument considered in favor of applying strict scrutiny
analysis and rejected by the court focused specifically on the statutory
definition of "Hispanic., 21 1 Under this argument, the court would have
to subject the definition to strict scrutiny analysis, but ultimately find
that it failed this test because the definition was underinclusive. 2 2 To
of a
survive such a challenge, New York would have to justify its choice
213
particular definition of "Hispanic" over an alternative definition.
The court rejected this argument because, "'strict scrutiny is designed
to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the
sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for
the use of race in that particular context."' 2 14 Once the government
satisfies the strict scrutiny test for the use of race, the specific
applications of the program are not subject to heightened review but
rather left to the government.215
The court's rejection of this argument appears to be centered on
prudential concerns about the appropriate role of the judiciary once the
government defines its selected groups. The court indicated its concern
with the automatic application of strict scrutiny to an inherently
imprecise process.21 6 According to the court, since any racial
classification "will always exclude persons who have individually
suffered past discrimination and include those who have not [suffered
discrimination]," the court's role should be limited to the initial
determination that the remedy for the discriminatory evil may, as a
217
constitutional matter, include racial and national origin classifications.
An underinclusive program, according to the court, nevertheless may
be subject to strict scrutiny if the plaintiff establishes that the
underinclusiveness was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.21 8 Where
the plaintiff claims that the government has chosen to benefit only
certain "Hispanics," strict scrutiny may apply if the plaintiff establishes
intentional discrimination against "the groups of Hispanics that were
excluded. 2 1 9 This shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show legislative
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 200, 209.
See id. at 205, 210.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 210 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)).
Id. at 210.
See id.

217. Id. at 210-11.

218. See id. at 211.
219. Id.
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discriminatory intent before the court will apply the strict scrutiny
standard. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish "antiSpanish animus," and therefore failed to trigger strict scrutiny.220
Reviewing the plaintiffs challenge under the rational basis test, the
court easily determined that "it was not irrational for New York to
conclude that Hispanics of Latin American origin were in greater need
of remedial legislation. 22'
The difficulty with this "flexible" standard is that it turns on its head
equal protection doctrine, which has historically placed the burden on
the government to justify its decision to treat persons differently based
on race or national origin. The choice to categorize based on race and
national origin is suspect, and this is the reason that such choices are
222
Indeed, treating such categorizations as
subject to strict scrutiny.
suspect is the core of the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence.
In part, the Second Circuit recasts the burden of the
underinclusiveness argument onto the plaintiff because of the court's
mischaracterization of the plaintiffs claim as a challenge to a "racial
definition. 223 Although the court states that it is assessing a claim about
the definition of "Hispanic," and throughout the decision refers to the
challenge as based on national origin and ethnic categories, it vacillates
between its characterization of the claim as one based on race and one
224
Its analysis lacks any deep understanding of
based on national origin.
the difference between race, national origin and ethnic categories. While
a racial category is not static and may have different apparitions, it is
generally perceived to be centered on one common physical
characteristic shared by the group members, namely "race" or
pigmentation.225 It can be defined merely by reference to this singular
characteristic. A national origin category, by contrast, includes members
of various backgrounds and histories that may share multiple common
overriding and solidifying characteristics, but that are defined by certain

220. Id. at 212.
221. Id. at 214.
222. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
223. Jana-Rock,438 F.3d at 210-1I.
224. Id. Indeed, the court referred to race twenty-nine times in its opinion, almost three times
more than national origin, to which it referred eleven times, and almost fifteen times more than the
number of times it referred to ethnicity, which was a mere two times. See id.
225. See, e.g., Haney L6pez, supra note 113.
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differences. 226 Latinos share common characteristics generally including
the Spanish or Portuguese language and a history of Spanish or
Portuguese

dominion

and conquest. 2 27

However,

a "Latino"

or

"Hispanic" category consists of diverse subclasses of members from
different countries within Latin America and the Latin Caribbean, and
with different histories and cultures represented by these discrete
national origins.228 Latinos' connections and affiliations to their
individual or ancestral country of national origin, and those countries'
respective cultures and histories are not insignificant or overshadowed
by their presence in the United States. 229 Latinos define themselves
based on their country of national origin--their affiliation to ancestral
and historical roots outside of the United States. 230 Regardless of their
U.S. citizenship status, Latinos self identify as part of a national origin
subclass, for example, Puerto Rican, Mexican, Dominican.2 3'
Moreover, "Latinos" as an equal protection group share a history of
discrimination and disempowerment in the United States and are defined
by their status within U.S. society as compared to members of other
groups.232 The definition of Latino then is based on relationships forged
inside and outside of the United States. It is one based on self
identification and on identification by non-Latinos.
In practice, the Second Circuit's approach will result in strict scrutiny
which is "fatal in fact. 2 33 A plaintiff arguing underinclusiveness under
this approach has the particularly arduous task of establishing animosity
towards a specific subclass. This is so mainly because if the plaintiff
226. See supra Part I.B.
227. See ENGLISH USAGE AMONG HISPANICS STUDY, supra note 76.
228. LATINOS: REMAKING AMERICA 1-37 (Marcelo M. Suirez-Orozco & Mariela M. Piez eds.
University of California Press 2002) (providing an overview of the heterogeneity of Latino
population in the United States).
229. See MORIN, supra note 12, at 8-10; PEW HISPANIC CENTER, 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF
LATINOS, supra, note 76; TAFOYA, supra note 121.
230. See PEW HISPANIC CENTER, 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS, supra note 76.
231. See id.
232. See supra Part I.
233. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (concluding that strict scrutiny
applied to any and all race-based government decisions does not result in strict scrutiny that is
"'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980))
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003)
(upholding, in a 5-4 decision, the University of Michigan Law School's use of race as a factor in
student admissions, after subjecting the program to strict scrutiny, but signaling that affirmative
action may be subject to a short-term deadline, stating that "[w]e expect that 25 years from now, the
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.").
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seeks to participate in the program, the plaintiff will necessarily concede
that there is a compelling interest and that, but for the underinclusiveness
of a group category, the program is narrowly tailored to further the
compelling interest. Left with a narrow basis to challenge the category,
which cannot include an argument that the government could have done
more, 234 a plaintiff would have to show that their subclass was
specifically targeted for exclusion. Such a showing is nearly impossible
to make given that there is considerable misunderstanding and
misinformation about Latinos as a group and as a collection of various
subclasses.
The Second Circuit's approach is at odds with equal protection
doctrine and is an unworkable standard of judicial review of government
national origin classifications.
B.

Builders Association of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook

In Builders Association of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook,235 the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the County's minority- and womenowned business enterprise program was unconstitutional because the
government locality did not establish the need for the remedy, and
because it was overinclusive 3 6 The court concluded that the ordinance
was overinclusive because the County's "laundry list of favored
minorities" included persons whose ancestors were from Spain or
Portugal--persons whom the court stated common sense dictated "have
never been subject to significant discrimination by Cook County. 237
In Builders, Cook County passed an ordinance establishing the
Minority- and Women-Owned Business Enterprise Program, which
provided that thirty percent of the total value of the County's
construction contracts be awarded to enterprises that were at least fiftyone percent owned by minorities, and ten percent of the total value of
County contracts to enterprises that were at least fifty-one percent owned
by women, requirements that could be met with subcontractors.238 The
234. The Second Circuit stated that the legislature did not violate equal protection under rational
basis review if it did not attempt to remedy at once all forms of discrimination. Jana-Rock Constr.,
Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that "[u]nder

rational basis review, '[t]he legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there,
neglecting the others."' (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955))).
235. 256 F.3d 642, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2001).

236. Id. at 645-46.
237. Id. at 647.
238. Id. at 643.
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challenge asserted that the ordinance constituted an equal protection
violation. a39
Ostensibly, the County had argued it was seeking to remedy past
discrimination in the construction industry. 240 The court concluded that
there was "no credible evidence that Cook County in the award of
construction contracts ever intentionally (or for that matter
unintentionally) discriminated against any of the groups favored by the
program.,2 4 1 The court then concluded that the ordinance similarly failed
to comply with the narrow tailoring requirement because "the remedy
goes further than is necessary to eliminate the evil against which it is
directed. 242
The court set forth its interpretation of who could properly be
determined to have suffered discrimination because of "Hispanic
ethnicity":
[T]he concern with discrimination on the basis of Hispanic
ethnicity is limited to discrimination against people of South or
Central American origin, who often are racially distinct from
persons of direct European origin because their ancestors
include [B]lacks or Indians or both; of course they may instead
or as well be ethnically distinct on the basis of culture or
language. The concern with racial discrimination does not
extend to Spanish or Portuguese people, or the concern with
ethnic discrimination to persons of Spanish or Portuguese
ancestry born in the United States; but even as to those born
abroad, there is nothing to differentiate immigrants from Spain
or Portugal from immigrants from Italy, Greece, or other
southern European countries so far as a history of discrimination
in the United States is concerned.243
Following the Supreme Court's directive to apply heightened scrutiny
to race-based discrimination, the Seventh Circuit applied the existing
239. Id.
240. The Seventh Circuit stated that Cook County failed to provide evidence to support any
argument that the ordinance sought to remedy past discrimination in the award of construction
contracts by the County, or as a result of the County having served as a "passive participant" in
private discrimination by prime contractors. Id. at 645 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1167, 1175 (10th
Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 941 (2001)).
241. Id. at 645 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 735-37
(6th Cir. 2000)).
242. Id., at 647.

243. Id.
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strict scrutiny equal protection analysis and concluded that there was no
compelling interest established, and that the program was not narrowly
tailored even if there was a compelling interest to support the
ordinance's remedial plan.244 The Seventh Circuit's discussion of the
"Hispanic" category appears to consider the differences between
subclasses of Latinos and members of other ethnic or racial groups.245
Here too, as in Jana-Rock, the court relies on its understanding of race
and racial categories to define who is "Hispanic." As the court states
specifically, discrimination related to Hispanic ethnicity "is limited to
discrimination against people of South or Central American origin, who
often are racially distinct from persons of direct European origin because
their ancestors include [B]lacks or Indians or both. 24 6 However, the
court also recognizes that there are other legally consequential
differences: "of course they may instead or as well be ethnically distinct
on the basis of culture or language. 24 7
Despite appearances, the court's definition of "Hispanic" is dependent
on narrow presumptions of who is "Hispanic." This distinction is clearly
illustrated in the court's comparison of Spanish and Portuguese people to
Hispanics, and the reasoning employed by the court in concluding that
Spaniards and Portuguese cannot be considered "Hispanic."
The concern with racial discrimination does not extend to
Spanish or Portuguese people, or the concern with ethnic
discrimination to persons of Spanish or Portuguese ancestry
born in the United States; but even as to those born abroad, there
is nothing to differentiate immigrants from Spain or Portugal
from immigrants from Italy, Greece, or other southern European
countries so far as a history of discrimination in the United
States is concerned... Anyone of recent foreign origin might be
able to demonstrate that he or she was a victim of ethnic
discrimination, but to presume such discrimination merely on
the basis of having an ancestor who had been born in the Iberian
peninsula is unreasonable. 48
The Seventh Circuit's analysis is wholly dependent on a definition of
"Hispanic" as a non-White race of foreign born immigrants. Although

244. Id at 645-47.
245. Id. at 647.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 645.
248. Id. (citing Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1559-61 (11th Cir. 1994)).
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the court references a "history of discrimination in the United States,

249

its analysis lacks grounding in that history and in the history relevant to
the equal protection analysis-the history of discrimination suffered by
Latinos in Cook County and in Illinois. The court limits its references to
Hispanics as persons of South or Central American origin, without
mention of Puerto Ricans as a Caribbean population present in Cook
County and throughout Illinois. The court also presumes that Hispanics
are foreign-born immigrants, when Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens at
birth, and both Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans in Illinois and
Cook County have been present in Illinois-and the United States-for
over a century. 250 Thus, while the Seventh Circuit properly recognized
the significance of culture, language and history of discrimination in the
United States as relevant to the definition of "Hispanic" and its attendant
subclasses, it based its definition on presumptions that are not an
accurate representation of who is Latino.
C.

Associated General Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik

The Sixth Circuit held in Associated General Contractors of Ohio,
Inc. v. Drabik,25 1 that Ohio's Minority Business Enterprise Act (MBEA)
was unconstitutional because there was no evidence of a compelling
government interest, and because the MBEA was both over- and
underinclusive and therefore not narrowly tailored.252
The MBEA set aside five percent of all state contracts for exclusive
bidding by state certified minority-owned business enterprises (MBE).253
The MBEA permitted MBEs to bid on all contracts but limited nonMBEs to non-set-aside contract bids.254 The State defined an MBE as a
business at least fifty-one percent owned and controlled for at least one
year prior, by "members of one of the following economically
disadvantaged groups: Blacks, American Indians, Hispanics, and

249. Id. at 645-47.
250. See Rob Paral et al., Latino Demographic Growth in Metropolitan Chicago, RESEARCH
REPORTS, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME INSTITUTE FOR LATINO STUDIES app. 1, December 2004, at
22-23, available at http://latinostudies.nd.edu/pubs/pubs/paral.pdf.
251. Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000) (Drabik).
252. Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Croson and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Sixth Circuit had upheld the constitutionality of the MBEA. Ohio
Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983).
253. Drabik, 214 F.3d at 733 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 123.151(C)(1)).
254. Id. at 733.
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256
Orientals.,, 255 The plaintiffs represented a group of trade associations

who asserted an equal protection challenge to the MBEA-mandated
exclusion of their non-minority members from bidding
on part of a
257
construction project of the Toledo Correctional Facility.

Applying the traditional strict scrutiny standard to the plaintiffs'
claims, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the State would have a
compelling interest in "assuring that public dollars ... do not serve to

finance the evil of private prejudice, 258 as well as in "remedying the
effects of past discrimination., 259 However, the court concluded that the
State failed to carry its burden and establish the State's own prior
discrimination or any private discrimination in which the State served as
a passive participant.2 60
The circuit court then considered the second constitutional prong of
the equal protection test and concluded that the MBEA was not narrowly
tailored.26 1 In its discussion the Sixth Circuit noted that the MBEA was
both over and underinclusive.262 By "lumping together '26 3 various
groups within the definition of minority the MBEA allowed for
preferences absent discrimination, making the MBEA overinclusive.2 64
At the same time, it potentially failed to allow "relief to groups where
discrimination might have been proven, 2 65 making it underinclusive.
The MBEA included within its coverage Blacks, Native Americans, as

255. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 122.71(E)).
256. The plaintiffs were Associated General Contractors of Ohio and Associated General
Contractors of Northwest Ohio. Id. at 733.
The irony of state-proscribed exclusive bidding for minority contractors, and the non-minority
contractors' competing desire for the right to bid, on the Toledo Correctional Facility-where
people of color are the majority of the prison population at the Toledo Correctional Facility-is only
one of the interesting facets of this case. Another curious aspect of the case is the absence of any
mention of the trade associations' responsibility to the interests of their minority members.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 734-35 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S 469, 492 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
259. Id. at 735 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 503; United Black Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Akron,
976 F.2d 999, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1992)).
260. Id. at 735. For a discussion of the insufficiency of the State's evidence and the type of
evidence that would have been appropriate, see id. at 735-37.
261. Id. at 737-38.
262. Id. at 737.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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well as undefined categories of "Hispanics" and "Orientals.,

266

The

court determined that the MBEA was not a narrowly-tailored remedy
because it placed African-Americans--a group that has historically
suffered discrimination in Ohio-on the same footing as other minority
groups that recently arrived to Ohio and are therefore unlikely to have
experienced historical discrimination in Ohio.26 7
The Sixth Circuit's analysis of national origin categories merely pits
one category against another-African Americans against Asians. The
court did not have before it any definition of the "Hispanic" category
from which to base an analysis about whether subclasses should be
subject to strict scrutiny. It appears from the court's example of the Thai
contractor 268 -an obvious reference to a subclass from the "Oriental"
category--that the circuit court applied strict scrutiny's second prong,
requiring narrowly-tailored programs across the board, irrespective of
category or subclassification status. The advantage of this approach is
simplification and uniformity; the disadvantage is that it does not
consider the historical commonalities of discrimination shared by
members of the subclass, which are taken into consideration by inclusion
in the umbrella category.
D.

Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson

269
The Ninth Circuit concluded in Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson
that California's minority contract set-aside program
was
unconstitutional. 270 At issue in Monterey Mechanicalwas the California
Public Contract Code, which required that general contractors
subcontract part of the work to subcontractors at least fifty-one percent
27
owned and controlled by minorities, women and disabled veterans. '
The statute set forth percentage work goals for the subcontractor groups:

266. Id. at 733, 737. 1 consider the term "Oriental" to be an inappropriate and racially and
ethnically inaccurate name for a category that appears to encompass Asians of various backgrounds.
I have used the term in quotes because it is the exact terminology found in the challenged
legislation.
267. Id. at 737 (describing how under the MBEA, an African-American contractor in Ohio might

not receive a state contract while a contractor of Thai origin who recently arrived in Ohio might
receive ten percent of the state contracts, in satisfaction of the statutory percentage set-asides).
268. Id.
269. 125 F.3d 702 (9th 1997), reh'gdenied, 138 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1998).
270. Id. at 715 (holding that the California minority business set-aside program violated the Equal

Protection Clause).
271. Id. at 704.
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fifteen percent for minority business enterprises, five percent for women,
and three percent for disabled veterans.272 In the alternative, a contractor
could still bid if it made a good faith effort to hire such subcontractors,
and properly documented such efforts.273 California Polytechnic State
University, San Luis Obispo sought bids for a utilities upgrade.27 4 The
plaintiff, Monterey Mechanical, had the lowest bid but lost to the second
lowest bidder. 275 Monterey Mechanical was disqualified from the
bidding for failure to comply with the California Public Contract
Code.2 76 Monterey Mechanical did not hire subcontractors from within
the targeted groups, and although it claimed it made efforts to hire, it
failed to properly document such efforts.2 77 Although the bid awardee
also failed to hire subcontractors from the Code groups, it properly and
adequately documented its "good faith efforts" within the meaning of the
statute.278
The court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary
injunction because they were likely to succeed on their equal protection
claim, first because the Act was not supported by legislative or judicial
factual findings of past discrimination, and second, because it was
overbroad and not narrowly tailored.2 79 Discussing the second
requirement of the strict scrutiny standard, the Ninth Circuit found the
statutory definition of "minority" extended to "groups highly unlikely to
have been discriminated against in the California construction
industry. 280 According to the Ninth Circuit, the inclusion of Aleuts
-for whom there is no history of active or passive discrimination in

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 713-14. The Ninth Circuit set forth the strict scrutiny standard for race-based
classifications and the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard for sex-based classifications,
although it did not address what if any would be the appropriate standard of the two as applied to a
case involving a woman of color. Id. The court concluded that the State's statute was not justified
because there was not proof of government discrimination, and thus specifically avoided other
related issues, including the quantum of proof necessary to satisfy the classifications. Id. at 713
("Because the state made absolutely no attempt to justify the ethnic and sex discrimination it
imposed, we do not reach the questions of how much proof, or what kinds of legislative findings,
suffice.").
280. Id. at 714.
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California, or at the California State Polytechnic University at San Luis
Obispo-in the definition of Native American established the statute's
overbreadth and constitutional deficiency.281 Comparing Monterey
Mechanical to Croson, where the Supreme Court noted disapprovingly
of the inclusion of Aleuts in the Richmond County plan because they
lacked a history of discrimination in the County, 2 the Ninth Circuit
stated that, "some of the groups designated are, in the context of a
California construction industry statute, red flags signalling [sic] that the
statue is not, as the Equal Protection Clause requires, narrowly
tailored., 283 In Monterey Mechanical, the Ninth Circuit evaluated a
subclassification and found it lacking.284 In this case Aleut was a
statutory subclass of Native American.2 85
As in Drabik, the circuit court did not discuss the definition of
"Hispanic." Unlike the court in Drabik, however, the circuit court in
Monterey Mechanical did have before it a statutory definition for
"Hispanic." 286 The California Code defined "Hispanic" as, "a person of
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other
Spanish or Portuguese culture or origin regardless of race. 28 7
Nevertheless, the subclassification would have been subject to the same
deficiency as that noted for the inclusion of Aleuts. The inclusion of
persons who are Spanish or Portuguese, as the Seventh Circuit noted in
Builders Association of GreaterChicago,288 may well have rendered the
statutory definition overbroad and incapable of satisfying the narrowlytailored requirement of strict scrutiny if the court could not find a history
281. Id. 714-15.
282. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989).
283. Monterey Mech., 125 F.3d at 714.
284. See id. at 714-15 (1997).
285. Id. at 714 (quoting CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE, § 10115.1(d) (1994), which defines a Native
American person as "an American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, or Native Hawaiian").
286. Id.
287. Id. The court quoted CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10115.1(d) (1994), which states:
"Minority," for purposes of this section, means a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the
United States who is an ethnic person of color and who is: Black (a person having origins in
any of the Black racial groups of Africa); Hispanic (a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban,
Central or South American, or other Spanish or Portuguese culture or origin regardless of
race); Native American (an American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, or Native Hawaiian); PacificAsian (a person whose origins are from Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia, the Philippines, Samoa, Guam, or the United States Trust Territories of the Pacific
including the Northern Marianas); Asian-Indian (a person whose origins are from India,
Pakistan, or Bangladesh); or any other group of natural persons identified as minorities in the
respective project specifications of an awarding department or participating local agency.
288. Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (2001).
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of discrimination against persons of Spanish and Portuguese ancestry by
the State of California.
Although the analysis appears watertight, in reality the court's sole
reliance on a history of prior discrimination against the subclass failed to
consider the connection to the national origin and ethnic "Hispanic"
category, and whether that connection resulted in discrimination that
justified inclusion within the government's definition of "Hispanic." In
addition to discrimination suffered as a direct consequence of affiliation
with a particular national origin subclass, Latinos are also subject to
discrimination as members of the perceived monolithic and
homogeneous "Hispanic" group. This latter basis for discrimination is
based on common language, and cultural and historical similarities. That
is "sameness." The former basis is dependent on recognition of the
varied histories of the subclass itself-in other words on "difference."
E.

Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County I & II

The Eleventh Circuit's 1991 decision in the protracted litigation
involving a challenge to the Metropolitan Dade County firefighter
affirmative action hiring plan in Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County
(Peightal ),289 kept alive the plaintiffs equal protection challenge, and
concluded that the plan was neither over- nor underinclusive due to the
plan's treatment of Hispanics. 290 The 1991 decision remanded the case to
the district court for consideration of the equal protection claim. 29 1 The
circuit court in 1994 affirmed the subsequent district court decision that
the plan survived strict scrutiny in Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade
County (Peightal 1/).292 In that decision, the circuit court again
concluded that the plan was neither over- nor underinclusive.29 3 Both
decisions predated Adarand.294
289. Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1991) (Peightal 1). This litigation
is placed in this Article chronologically prior to the 1992 case of O'Donnell Construction Co. v.
District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992), because this section discusses both the 1991
and 1994 appeals in the Peightal litigation.
290. Peightal1, 940 F.2d at 1408-10.
291. Id.
at 1411.
292. Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1548 (11 th Cir. 1994) (Peightal II).
293. Id.
at 1560-61.
294. Although both decisions predate the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), they are included in this discussion because they continue to be
good law within the Eleventh Circuit, and because they have been cited recently by the Second
Circuit in Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Under the County plan, applicants for firefighter positions with the
Dade County Fire Department took an examination and were placed on a
hiring list.295 The County's program sought to address the low number of

minorities in the Fire Department workforce, and to that end pursued
hiring goals to increase the number of women, Blacks, and Hispanics in
the Department. 296 The hiring list grouped and ranked applicants by
score within the applicant's particular race and gender classification. 297
The plan included the following group classifications: "Black males,
Black females, White females, Hispanic males, Hispanic females, and
White males. 298
In the 1991 appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the plan was
overinclusive because White European Spaniards were included in the
Hispanic classifications although they showed "no significant cultural or
linguistic discernability from non-Hispanic [W]hite persons., 299 The
plaintiff further argued that the plan was underinclusive because it did
not include members of non-Hispanic "national and ethnic groups that
are susceptible to similar discrimination,, 300 as those within the
"Hispanic" group.
Dade County defined Hispanic as "[a]ll persons of Mexican, Puerto
Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish culture or
origin, regardless of race.,,30 The plan further required that a person's
claimed identification with a racial or ethnic group "should accompany
strong visible indication that the person culturally and linguistically
identifies with the group he or she claims. 3 °2
The plaintiffs arguments illustrate how his claims of over- and
underinclusiveness were interwoven with stereotypes of racial and ethnic
characteristics, confusing "race," "color," "national origin," "ethnicity,"
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's cases are a legally valid part of the discourse on national origin
subclassifications.
295. Peightal1, 940 F.2d at 1395-96.
296. Id. at 1395. The County's goal was to increase the number of women and minorities in the
Fire Department as compared with the number of women and minorities in the general population.
Id. at 1396 ("The stated long-term goal of the Department's Plan was 'to attain parity [between the

Department's work force and] the population."').
297. Id. at 1396.
298. Id.

299. Id. at 1408.
300. Id. at 1409.
301. Id. Dade County applied the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC)
definition of"Hispanic." Id.
302. Id. (footnote omitted). The plan adopted this requirement from the EEOC. Id.

The Context That Matters

and "culture." For example, the plaintiff claimed overinclusiveness
because anyone who could trace their ancestry to Spain was included in
the definition, even though, the plaintiff argued, "white European
Spaniards with no visibly discemable 'Hispanic' characteristics have not
been subjected to past or present discrimination .... ,303 The court
rejected this argument because of the plan's self-identification
verification process which required, as described above, "visible
indication" of the person's
cultural and linguistic identification with the
30 4
racial or ethnic group.

The plaintiffs underinclusiveness claim fared no better before the
court. The court subjected the underinclusiveness claim to a rationality
test similar to the Second Circuit's approach in Jana-Rock. °5 The plan
excluded persons of European national origin, Middle Eastern national
origin, and Slavic/Russian national origin, but included persons of
Spanish origin.30 6 The plaintiff argued that the plan should have included
members of other groups who are "culturally and linguistically
discernable and subject to discrimination in the work place as a result of
their ethnic characteristics. 30 v Such exclusion, the plaintiff argued,
rendered the plan underinclusive and therefore unconstitutional.30 8 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Equal Protection Clause does not
require that the plan provide "for every ethnic group that may exist in a
community., 30 9 The circuit court found that a state acts rationally if it
may "'conclude that the groups ... preferred had a greater claim to
compensation than the groups it excluded.' 3 10 Since "[B]lacks and
Hispanics" are "the two most prevalent minority groups" in Dade
County, the circuit court concluded that the choice to address past
discrimination against them was rational. 3 1'
Whether the Eleventh
Circuit subjected
the plaintiff's
underinclusiveness argument to strict scrutiny and the narrowly-tailored
303. Id. The plaintiff argued that due to this extension to those not discriminated against, the plan
was not narrowly tailored and could not survive strict scrutiny. Id.
304. Id.
305. See id. at 1409-10.
306. See id.
307. Id. at 1409.
308. Id.

309. Id.
310. Id. at 1409-10 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 n.35
(1978)).
311. Id.
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prong of that test, or to the rational basis test, the court relied for its
rejection of the plaintiff's argument on an erroneous comparison of
"Hispanic"--treated as a homogeneous ethnic group-4o other
groups. 312 This comparison was initiated by the plaintiff in his argument
in support of the unconstitutionality of the program.313 As discussed
above, the circuit court's approach ignores the historical and cultural
realities of the various populations included within the category of
"Hispanic."
In his 1994 appeal, the plaintiff again charged that the plan was both
overinclusive and underinclusive because the definition of "Hispanic"
314
was amorphous and improperly relied on a self-identification process.
He argued that the plan was overinclusive because "it encompasse[d] the
same variety of ethnic and racial characteristics as are found in the
generalized classification of all English speaking nations .... 3" Thus,
he claimed the plan did not properly incorporate distinct racial
characteristics for members of the "Hispanic" category. The circuit court
rejected this argument. In order to avoid inclusion of persons not within
the definition, the County applied the approach of the EEOC which
required "'strong visible indication that the person culturally and
linguistically identifies with the group he or she claims.' 3 16 The court
concluded that this procedure ensured the plan would not be
overinclusive because it would screen out non-minorities not eligible for
relief. 317 Thus, the court explicitly endorsed the program's reliance on
cultural identification as a basis for inclusion in the race-based program.
The investigatory procedures utilized by the affirmative action
office operated as a check to the self-identification procedure
and also operated to narrow the definition of the protected group
to those with strong visible indications of cultural and linguistic
identification with the group, thus ensuring that non-minorities
3 18
would not erroneously receive race-conscious relief.

312. See id. at 1407-09.
313. See id. at 1408-09.
314. See Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1559 (11 th Cir. 1994) (PeightalII).
315. Id.

316. Id. at 1559.
317. Id. at 1559-61.
318. Id. at 1559-60. The court also notes linguistic identification as a basis for inclusion in the
program. Id.
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The court rejected the underinclusiveness argument because the
plaintiff failed to establish that those excluded from the program--such
as people of Portuguese descent--suffered prior discrimination." 9 Thus,
like the Second Circuit in Jana-Rock, the court firmly placed the burden
on the plaintiff to establish the record of subclass discrimination.32 ° Yet
the Eleventh Circuit stated that there is difficulty in defining a group
without relying on some social stereotype:
The most troubling facet of defining a group who have [sic]
been the victims of prior discrimination is the derivation of the
definition itself ....

Because

of the irrationality

of the

definitional process underlying social stereotypes, it is equally
vexatious to develop a definition, or to criticize one that has
been developed, without resort to the same stereotypes which
application of the definition seeks to eradicate. 32'
The Eleventh Circuit's approach to the "Hispanic" definition and
subclassifications is based on stereotypes of racial parameters and
comparisons. First, the court's analysis of the overinclusiveness
argument relies on the construction of "Hispanics" as a racial minority, a
minority that can be discerned based on physical characteristics.
Although the circuit court speaks of "cultural and linguistic
identification with the group ' 322 as a basis to determine category
members, the court provides no basis for establishing such identification
other than "strong visible indications" that ensure "non-minorities would
not erroneously receive race-conscious relief. 32 3 The court equated
visible markers and cues with legal evidentiary proof of racial minority
status. The court did not clarify how language and culture can be used as
legal proof of racial minority status.
319. Id. at 1561.
320. Id.
321. See id. at 1561 n.25.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 1559-60 (emphasis added). In further rejecting the plaintiff's overinclusiveness

argument, the circuit court relied on Croson's statement that inclusion of racial groups that have not
suffered prior discrimination could indicate the plan was not narrowly tailored. See id. at 1560
(citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989)). The circuit court also
noted that Peightal had not shown that a non-minority received race-conscious relief:
The affirmative action office interviewed applicants or employees whose minority status was
challenged, applying the EEOC guidelines to the person's self-identification .... [The
plaintiff] failed to adduce one instance in which application of the definition and guidelines
produced an overinclusive result, whereby a non-minority received race-conscious relief.
Id. at 1560.
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The court's analysis is particularly troubling since its other reference
to language as a "Hispanic" category marker is used to demonstrate the
difficulty in developing accurate definitions:
[A] number of affirmative action programs have tried to develop
a narrower substitute for the term "Hispanic" ..... [Tihese

alternative definitions may similarly suffer from the infirmity of
overinclusiveness under the analysis employed by [the plaintiff].
For example, Spanish-surnamed individuals could include those
individuals who have married someone of Spanish ancestry but
who themselves lack Spanish heritage. Similarly, the group of
Spanish-speaking individuals could include persons of
ancestry who have simply chosen to learn a second
Caucasian
32 4
language.

While the Eleventh Circuit struggles with a basis for constitutionally
testing the validity and propriety of the Hispanic category definition and
its constituent subclassifications, it relies on race-based measures and
relegates linguistic markers to the status of mutable characteristics with
little probative value. Yet, as discussed in this Article, language is not
merely a method of communication, but is a significant cultural and
national group identifier.325 The court's decision is another example of
the strained analysis courts apply to national origin categories and
subclassifications and the judicial uncertainty as to the appropriate
consideration and treatment to accord language and culture, independent
of their connection to race.
F.

O'Donnell Construction Co. v. District of Columbia

Analysis of case law in this area would not be complete without an
overview of O'Donnell Construction Co. v. District of Columbia,3 26 a
Fifth Amendment Equal Protection case decided after Croson and before
Adarand. Although it did not address Latino or other subclassifications,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the District
Contracting Act ("Act") violated the plaintiffs
of Columbia's Minority
32 7
equal protection right.

324. Id. at 1560 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
325. See supra Part I.B.
326. 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
327. Id. at 421. In accordance with the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection principles apply to the District of Columbia's legislation. Id. at 424 (citing Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
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In deciding that the plaintiff in O'Donnell was entitled to a
preliminary injunction, the circuit court considered the constitutionality
of the Act's requirement that each District agency allocate its
construction contracts in order to provide thirty-five percent of the
monetary value of the contracts to local minority business enterprises
(MBE).3 28 The Act defined "minority" as: "Black Americans, Native
Americans, Asian Americans, Pacific Islander Americans, and Hispanic
Americans, who by virtue of being members of the foregoing groups, are
economically and socially disadvantaged because of historical
discrimination practiced against
these groups by institutions within the
3 29
United States of America.
To achieve the thirty-five percent goal, the District of Columbia set
up a sheltered market program, under which agencies set aside contracts
and subcontracts for bidding exclusively among MBEs. 330 While MBEs
could bid on both sheltered market and non-sheltered market contracts,
non-MBE contractors could only bid on non-sheltered market
contracts.33
The court concluded that the Act could probably not survive
constitutional review. 332 There was no constitutionally competent
evidence to establish that "agencies of the District of Columbia had been
favoring [W]hite contractors over non-[W]hites, or that the typical
bidding process was somehow rigged to have this effect. 333 Moreover,
328. Id. at 422.
329. Id. (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1142(1)). The District of Columbia passed legislation,
entitled the "Small, Local, and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Development and Assistance Act
of 2005," D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-218.01, that provides mandatory set-asides of contracts for
"disadvantaged business enterprises." See id. § 2-218.46(a)(1) (2007) "Disadvantaged business
enterprises" includes a business enterprise owned, operated, and controlled by economically
disadvantaged individuals. See id. § 2-218.33(a)(1). An "economically disadvantaged individual" is
statutorily defined as:
an individual whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system is impaired because of
diminished opportunities to obtain capital and credit as compared to others in the same line of
business where such impairment is related to the individual's status as socially disadvantaged.
An individual is socially disadvantaged if the individual has reason to believe that the
individual has been subjected to prejudice or bias because of his or her identity as a member of
a group without regard to his or her qualities as an individual.
Id. § 2-218.02.
330. O'Donnell, 963 F.2d at 422.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 428-29 (finding that the plaintiff had made a strong showing that it was likely to
prevail in its equal protection challenge and reversing the district court's denial of the plaintiffs
motion for a preliminary injunction).
333. Id. at 425 (comparing the lack of evidence of historical discrimination with Associated Gen.
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due to the insufficiency of the evidence, the court could not assess
"whether the sheltered market approach is a remedy 'narrowly tailored
to remedy prior discrimination.' 334 The court noted that335
"the scope of
that remedy must depend upon the scope of the violation.,
The court similarly concluded that there were no findings that all of
the groups listed within the definition of "minority" had suffered
discrimination.33 6 Specifically, the court stated:
[T]he Council has never made any findings with respect to
discrimination in the construction industry against Hispanic
Americans, Asian Americans, Pacific Islander Americans, or
Native Americans. .. . [T]here is no way of saying whether the

remedy the Council has chosen is narrowly tailored to provide
remedial337relief for the amalgam of minority groups covered by
the Act.

Although it appears that there were no findings whatsoever regarding
"Hispanics" and the other groups cited by the court, any such findings
would have had to set forth the boundaries of the definition in order to
properly assess the nature of the discrimination.
IV. AN EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARD FOR LAT[NO
NATIONAL ORIGIN SUBCLASSES
The strict scrutiny and rational basis tests are not the proper legal
standards for assessing national origin subclassifications because these
tests as applied have given too much weight to the role of race as
compared to other characteristics. National origin subclassifications
should be assessed according to a contextualized analysis of
discrimination against Latino members of the subclass; such analysis
must incorporate more than race-based discrimination. I propose an
equal protection standard responsive to national origin discrimination
against Latinos, experienced because they are members of a general
"Latino" category, and because they are members of particular

Contractorsof Cal. v. Coal.for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1414 (9th Cir. 1991), where that court
noted substantial findings of prior discrimination in the local construction industry).
334. Id. at 427 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989)).
335. Id. at 425 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971);
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-20 (1977)).

336. Id.
337. Id.
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subclasses that constitute that category. 338 The standard seeks to
contextualize culture, ethnicity, language, and historical status, along
with race.339 Moreover, the proposed equal protection subclassification
standard would require not only a consideration of how the subclasses'
experiences may be varied, but also on how they share commonalities.
These commonalities are captured in categorization as "Latinos."
Peoples from different Latin American and Latino Caribbean
countries have made their home in the United States for over a
century. 340 For various political and social reasons, these populations
from different countries with different histories have been placed under
the homogeneous categories of "Latino" and "Hispanic. 3 41 While these
homogeneous categories efficiently identify disparate peoples who share
common languages (Spanish and Portuguese), regional histories of
conquest and dominion, 342 and similar discriminatory experiences within
the United States, 343 these categories mask the heterogeneity of the
subpopulations that make up "Latinos" in the United States. As has been
discussed in this Article, subclassifications are the national origin
subpopulations that constitute the "Latino" and "Hispanic" category
membership recognized by government and the U.S. population, and
they are the primary groups that Latinos use for self-identification. 344 As
a legal matter, these subclassifications are necessary in order to
deconstruct the "Latino" and "Hispanic" category into its constituent
members, to "dehomogenize" the "Latino" identity, and to assess the
constitutionality of treatment based on affiliation with a particular
country of national origin.
Courts have taken different approaches to assessing the Latino
category and subclassifications, generally focusing on the race-focused
338. See supra Part L.C and accompanying notes. The standard proposed in this Article is also
applicable to other national origin and ethnic groups, but relies on the treatment of Latinos under the
law to illustrate its viability and application.
339. As discussed in this Article, context matters. See, e.g.,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
327 (2003) (stating that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under
the Equal Protection Clause").
340. See H6ctor

Cordero-Guzman

&

Ted

Henken,

Immigration, in 2

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATINOS & LATINAS IN THE UNITED STATES

THE

OXFORD

340-46 (Suzanne Oboler & Deena

J. Gonzalez eds., 2005).
341. See supra Part L.B & .C.
342. See generally MORIN, supra note 12.
343. See supra note 90.
344. See PEW HISPANIC CENTER, 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS, supra note 76, at23; see

also supra Part L.B and accompanying notes.
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strict scrutiny/rational basis dichotomous analytic model. 345 These
approaches do not sufficiently consider the range of Latino experience,
in particular the varied histories of particular national origin subclasses.
A more appropriate subclassification equal protection analysis would
instead hold subclassifications constitutional if the broad governmental
classification based on national origin or ethnicity 346 survived Adarand
and Croson strict scrutiny.34 7 In order to survive constitutional review
the inclusion of subclassifications, however, must be based on
intragroup dynamics and histories of the relevant target subgroup. Thus,
the national origin group "Latino" or "Hispanic" would be defined by
subclassifications that reflect the historical and political position of
persons from specific subgroups of Latin American and LatinoCaribbean descent known within the jurisdiction. Although the Equal
Protection Clause protects persons not groups, 348 the Supreme Court has
recognized that the history of groups with which individuals identify has
a place within equal protection analysis.34 9 Therefore, there is Supreme
Court precedent for a full analysis of the propriety of subclassifications
based on the historical and political context of the target subgroup.
Applying the proposed standard to the circuit court cases discussed in
the prior section illustrates this analysis. The New York statute at issue
in Jana-Rock defined those eligible to participate in its minority-owned
business program to include Hispanics.350 This group is defined in the
statute as "persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Dominican, Cuban,
Central or South American [sic] of either Indian or Hispanic origin,

345. See supra Part III and accompanying notes.

346. The broad categories have usually included race, national origin, ethnicity and, occasionally,
gender. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 733 (4th ed. 2007).
347. In this Article, I have not explored or critiqued the propriety of the Court's Equal Protection
analytical framework. I have objections to the current Equal Protection analysis applied by the
courts based on Supreme Court precedent. However, since it appears that the existing framework,
with its attendant requirement that all race and national origin-based governmental classifications
satisfy strict scrutiny, will continue to hold validity with the Supreme Court for some time, I have
accepted, for purposes of the discussion in this Article, that national origin subclassifications must
comply with the existing Equal Protection Clause scrutiny framework, regardless of legislative
motive.
348. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("[T]he 'rights created
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The
rights established are personal rights."' (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
349. See supra Part I.A.
350. N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 310(8)(b) (2005).
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regardless of race. 351 Under the proposed equal protection standard,
New York's decision to provide a program based on national origin (the
"Hispanic" category) must survive strict scrutiny. The program must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. In JanaRock the plaintiff did not challenge the State's decision to institute an
affirmative action program, so the court did not have occasion to
consider whether New York could institute such a program.352 Assuming
that affirmative action would be a legitimate programmatic approach to
discrimination against minority-owned businesses, the court would
move to the next stage of the analysis.
The court would then determine whether the subclassifications as
defined reflect a historical, cultural and political reality and experience
of discrimination and inequality by members of the subclass. For
example, New York would have to provide a basis for including within
its definition of "Hispanic" persons who identify as Puerto Rican. In the
case of New York this would be a rather straightforward analysis of the
history of discrimination and inequality of Puerto Ricans in New York
State as relevant to the establishment of Puerto Rican-owned businesses.
A similar burden of proof would apply to the other subclassifications.
Although the court specifically stated that the question whether
Spaniards also suffer comparable discrimination to that suffered by
Hispanics was not before it and did not take a position on this issue, 353 it
is exactly the type of question that would be resolved under the proposed
standard.354 Since as the court noted there was evidence of
discrimination against Hispanics and no such evidence of a similar
history in the case of Spaniards, under the proposed standard New
York's choice of Latino subclasses would survive based on the evidence
of discrimination against Hispanics generally and subclasses
specifically, and the lack of comparable evidence in the case of
Spaniards.
Ostensibly, the court in Builders Association recognized the
significance of the historical and political context of discrimination
against members of the subclassifications.355 The Seventh Circuit's
351. Id.

352. Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 210 (2d Cir. 2006).
353. Id. at 213 n.8.
354. In Jana-Rock, the court correctly concluded that the plaintiffcould not establish anti-Spanish
animus because "it was not irrational for New York to conclude that Hispanics of Latin American
origin were in greater need of remedial legislation." 438 F.3d at 214.
355. See Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir.
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approach thus is similar to the standard proposed in this Article.
However, the Seventh Circuit narrowly defined Hispanic, as discussed
above.3 56 The equal protection standard suggested in this Article would
not, as the Seventh Circuit did, grant coverage to Latino subclasses
solely because they are a non-White race of foreign born immigrants.
The equal protection standard would also consider the discrimination
suffered as Latinos and members of subclasses in Cook County and
Illinois, including discrimination suffered irrespective of immigrant
status or pigmentation. The experiences based on race or immigrant
status would be considered under this approach but would not
necessarily be the focus of the analysis. Discrimination, for example,
based on cultural differences or language may also be considered.
Although the court's decision in Drabik does not contain a definition
or discussion of the Hispanic category and any potential subclasses, it
does refer to another national origin subclass.3 57 It also further indicates
the court's requirement of a race conscious justification.35 8 The Sixth
Circuit's comparison of the Thai subclass to African Americans lacks
any consideration of how the experiences and position of the subclass is
related to the larger category-here the "Oriental" category 359 a
comparison integral under the proposed subclassification equal
protection standard's approach. Moreover, the court's approach
compares a subclass to a broader category, 360 rather than comparing the
Hispanic category to the African American category, a more meaningful
and accurate comparison set.
The Monterey Mechanical court had before it the statutory
subclassifications for the Hispanic category. 361 Unlike the court in
Drabik which focused
on the propriety of the subclass as compared to a
larger category,3 62 the court in Monterey Mechanical focused on the

2001).

356. See supra Part 111.B.
357. Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 737 (6th Cir. 2000) (Drabik).
358. Id. at 738.
359. Id. at 737.
360. Id.
361. Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 714 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting CAL. PUB.
CONT. CODE, § 10115.1(d) (1994), which defined Hispanic as "a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican,
Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish or Portuguese culture or origin").
362. Drabik,214 F.3d at 737-38.
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subclass history of discrimination.36 3 Here the court failed to consider
the subclass's connection to the Hispanic category.
Under the proposed equal protection analysis, the term "Hispanic" in
the statute at issue in O'Donnell Construction Co. would be determined
based on the experiences of Latinos in Washington, D.C.. These
experiences would include those based on association with the Latino
category and with national origin subclass affiliation.
The approach of the court in the Peightal I & II litigation is vastly
different from the proposed subclassification standard.364 The PeightalH
court focused on physical or visible characteristics, thus relying on
racialized markers.365 Moreover, the court also treated linguistic
identification as the equivalent of language acquisition 366-which it is
not, because for Latinos language serves as more than a mode of
communication. 367 In contrast, the proposed subclassification standard
would consider the way Latinos and subclasses of Latinos are treated
based on race, culture and language, and would not prioritize visual
physical markers, or discount the role of linguistic identification.
The equal protection subclassification standard proposed in this
Article requires government to develop the basis for its subclassification
structure. While it may appear as an additional burden on government
not intended by the Supreme Court in Adarand, it is wholly in line with
Adarand's equal protection analysis and the Court's Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. At a minimum, it is arguably the type of
analysis required of the government by the narrow-tailoring prong of
equal protection analysis. The difference is that while the Supreme Court
has specifically applied this prong to the broad categorization of "race"
and "national origin," it has only commented on how the
subclassifications and further demarcations of protected groups must be
justified and
rationalized as narrowly tailored to further a compelling
368
interest.

363. Monterey Mech. at 714 (considering the propriety of including the subclassification "Aleut"
in an affirmative action statute in California).
364. See Peightal v. Metro. Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394 (11 th Cir. 1991) (PeightalI); Peightal v.
Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545 (1 Ith Cir. 1994) (Peighta11).
365. PeightalII, at 1559-60.
366. Id. at 1560.
367. See supra Part I.B.
368. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (plurality opinion); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
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This Article proposes that the subclassification analysis is no less
consequential than the analysis of the broad category of "Hispanic" or
"Latino." The government must do its work so that the subclassification
can withstand review and so that government genuinely and properly
responds to the needs of the subclasses encompassed within "Hispanic"
and "Latino" categories. Thus, as in Jana-Rock,369 a Puerto Rican
subclassification can survive review, but a subclassification that includes
persons who identify as Spaniards and Portuguese may be unable to
survive a searching review if the government is hard-pressed to establish
a history of discrimination and exclusion, or a cultural and political
experience of marginalization that disenfranchises or disempowers those
who identify with these subclasses, as compared with subclasses with
Latin American and Latino Caribbean histories.
CONCLUSION
The outcome-determinative question of how subclassifications within
national origin categories are legally evaluated has immediate currency
because the federal government and state governments rely on
subclassifications to define "Latino" and "Hispanic" for minority
business assistance programs. 370 The question also demands
consideration as the United States continues to grow and transform into
a nation of people representing highly stratified racial and ethnic
categories. Federal, state, and local governments will continue to
develop policies and strategies for equitably distributing government
funds and contracts to a highly diverse populace with competing claims
on interventionist policies and programs. To the extent that society and
government officials view such contract opportunities as vital to national
and local economies, questions about how to define and categorize those
interested in such opportunities must be resolved. Governments' choices
about how to denote program beneficiaries within a particular
classification scheme have been and will continue to be subject to claims
of unfair and unjustifiable racial and national origin classifications. As
governmental officials strive to ensure that their procedures and

369. Jana-Rock Constr. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2006).
370. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C) (2000); N.Y. EXEC LAW. L. §§ 310-318 (2005). These
programs are best known as "affirmative action" programs for minority-owned businesses, even
though they are actually remedial programs designed to remedy past discrimination and thus are
more akin to remedies that will compensate the recipient for something they were due and denied
because of their race or national origin.
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substantive criteria are fair and workable, they should also continue to
recognize groups that have been historically deprived access to and
excluded from such economic opportunities. That task as applied to
Latinos should also encompass a response to the various subgroups that
form Latino identity in the United States.
An analysis that explores the relevance of ethnicity, culture, language,
and race is paramount to protecting and ensuring the rights of all
members of a multicultural and multilingual population. This Article has
proposed a standard based on historical and socio-political experiences
of persons in the Latino category and within its distinct subclasses, as
well as the relational marginalization of subclasses based on intra- and
intergroup subclass status. The future of equal protection discourse
depends on reconstruction of equal protection analysis and on new
standards which adequately respond to the experiences of Latinos and
other national origin groups.
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